Minutes Exhibit B
Exhibit B Port Commission Regular Meeting of January 22, 2019 THE BRIEFING PROJECT EPISODE 17 — The Myth of Engagement — January 22, 2019 Thank you, Commissioners. My name is Steve Edmiston, | live Des Moines, I'm here for The of engagement, and Briefing Project. Today a bit of tough love. We'll discuss the myth communities particularly, the myth that the Port engages meaningfully with the airport neighbor from overflight noise and emissions. on the impacts to health and the environment That is the core lesson True engagement isnot just the right thing to do, but is legally required. becauseit just checks a box, from the City of Phoenix case. Where the engagement is a myth — — then the action based on the engagement or is a marketing campaign, or is simply inadequate the sun you are flying, the Phoenix is arbitrary and capricious. To get a sense for how close to in flight frequency would not be Court characterized the FAA's contention that a 300% increase “highly controversial” as “implausible.” Which is spine-tingler, because your regular consultant communities have recently Steve Alverson stated last year that the flights over our 3 Runway increased by — and you can’t make this stuff up — by 300%. must engage, let's be Now, hoping we agreethat just like Maverick at the end of Top Gun, you candid about the myth of engagement so we can fix it. the type of engagement the First, the myth is perpetuated when the Port refuses to provide direct request from Des communities need. One example. This summer, the Port flat refused a forced on the city, dozens of Port Moines for a town hall engagement. Worse, under the format from staff stood for hours in front of blank story boards and refused to answer questions citizens. | had my camera crew there. It's on film. It was surreal. words “quality of life” from Second, the myth of engagement was given oxygen by deleting the from last year allows the Port to the Port's bylaws and mission statement. This jaw-dropper issues that don’t place airport growth at risk, such as engage in selective environmentalism, on to protect quality of life biofuels, recycling, and shellfish, kelp, and eelgrass. Removing a duty 2018 Environmental also allows you to ignore science like the World Health Organization's blockbuster report in three months. Noise Guidelines. The Port has made no comment on this like START, Highline Third, the myth of engagement is perpetuated at stakeholder groups, control of the agenda and assuring Forum, and the SCATBd, that appear predicated upon Port Last week the Port refused to join the Port can distance itself from unwanted change. Example? for the simple creation of regional 15 other SCATB cities in a new legislative agenda calling airport siting committee. seminal 1969 “Arnstein Ladder” of The Port's approach presents a textbook application of the and therapy, the community engagement. On the bottom rungs, labeled manipulation powerless stakeholders are falsely engaged by placement on “rubberstamp advisory their committees or advisory boards” to educate them, or engineer their support, or change shared decision-making. views, instead of addressing the problem and providing top-rung Sounding super-duper familiar? Maverick, engage. Thank you for giving a citizen two-minutes to comment. | have copies of my own article on the Phoenix case, and the Arnstein Ladder, for each of you. www.thebriefingproject.com THE BRIEFING THE BRIEFING YOU ASKED FOR BUT DID NOT RECEIVE - IN TWO MINUTE PUBLIC COMMENTS PORT OF SEATTLE COMMISSION MEETING JANUARY 22, 2019 STEVE EDMISTON Episode 17 - The Myth of Engagement 1. Engagement - it’s the right thing to do. 2. The City of Phoenix and f ying to close to the sun? 3. The 300% coincidence. 4. The engagement we need but do not receive. 5. Deleting quality of ife to allow selective environmentalism and ignoring science. O. When good stakeho der groups go bad. ~ . Stuck on the bottom of the engagement ladder. CITY OF PHOENIX PLAYS “ROGUE ONE" TO FAA'S DEATH STAR Com me em em AN Du Ch ED RR GO EY OO me FS SD UD MM CR CD EN om OF ME WD SR £3 G3 SO GN ED 6D MG WR OE Mm FUKD ES Bh 4 B32 MD ON GD ER ER Em EReR Waom moa medium.com/@steveedmistonQ45/city-of-phoenix-plays-rogue-one-to-faas-death-star-a15b71 ae3b05 Steve Edmiston August 31,2017 Steve Edmiston Aug 31,2017 The Federal Aviation Administration's relentless nationwide rollout of satellite-navigation-based airport expansions was dealt a significant setback in City of Phoenix v. Huerta and Federal Aviation Administration, No. 15-1158 (D.C. Cir., August 29, 2017). The Court of Appeals sent the FAA a powerful message —that the FAA's playbook for implementing satellite-based route changes and frequency increases (sometimes known as “NextGen") in Phoenix failed to adequately identify the potential harm to humans, the environment, and historic neighborhoods, homes, parks, and sites, and it failed to give sufficient notice of the impacts to, and provide for sufficient involvement of, city officials and community groups. The FAA's actions—changing flight routes and increasing flight frequencies at the Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport —were deemed “arbitrary and capricious” under three different federal statutes —the National Historic Preservation Act, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA); and the Department of Transportation Act. The Court even admonished the FAA for tactics that appeared designed to seduce the City to delay filing suit, in order to claim the City waited too long to file suit. The case provides a useful roadmap for other airport neighbor cities, with a virtual step-by- step guide for reviewing the FAA's actions to determine whether the FAA failed to provide adequate notice and information to the proper individuals and groups, failed to collect needed information, and otherwise failed to comply with three federal statutes, before rolling out its satellite-based navigation procedures. Along the way, the Court provides some truly remarkable holdings. First, the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) suddenly becomes a critical component for community pushback against the FAA. The Court found the FAA failed to determine that no historic structures were adversely affected and failed to notify required parties and provide relevant documentation. The FAA's notice was deemed inadequate because the FAA was required to confirm, and did not confirm, that the individuals notified were the correct individuals for assuring compliance with the NHPA. Critically, for airport communities suffering from NextGen in other cities, the FAA failed because it did not provide the public with information about how action effects historic properties and seek public comment and input. Additionally, unless confidential information is involved, agencies must “provide the public with information about an undertaking and its effects on historic properties and seek public comment and input.” Id. § 800.2(d)(2) (emphasis added). The FAA admits, however, that it did not make “local citizens and community leaders” aware of the proposed new routes and procedures, J.A. 364, and it does not claim that any confidentiality concerns applied. Further, by keeping the public in the dark, the agency made it impossible for the public to submit views on the project’s potential effects—views that the FAA is required to consider. See 36 CFR. § 800.5(a); see also Am. Bird Conservancy v. FCC, 516 F.3d 1027, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Interested persons cannot request an [environmental assessment] for actions they do not know about, much less for actions already completed.”). The more you (don't) know. Second, under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the FAA wrongfully avoided a more detailed environmental impact statement by erroneously applying a “categorical exclusion” to the route changes. The Court again provided the roadmap, holding no categorical exclusion can apply if there are “extraordinary circumstances,” which exist when the action is “likely to be highly controversial on environmental grounds.” Perhaps the most excoriating FAA's proposal would quote in the case is this: “Common sense reveals otherwise. As noted, the increase by 300% the number of aircraft flying over twenty-five historic neighborhoods and buildings and nineteen public parks, with 85% of the new flight traffic coming from newjets. The idea that a change with these effects would not be highly controversial is ‘so implausible’ that it could not reflect reasoned decision-making.” concerns.” FAA Br. 80. Common sense reveals otherwise. As noted, the FAA’s proposal would increase by 300% the number of aircraft flying over twenty-five historic neighborhoods and buildings and nineteen public parks, with 85% ofthe new flight traffic coming from jets. The idea that a change with these effects would not be highly controversial is “so implausible” that it could not reflect reasoned decisionmaking. See Motor Vehicle Mfys. Ass'n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Common sense? What a concept. The FAA was also called to task for failing to take into account its prior experiences in similar circumstances at other airports. In other words, the FAA's divide-and-conquer strategy, claiming each airport is different, was rejected. The FAA should have provided a “reasoned explanation for... treating similar situations differently.” The FAA also erred by deviating from its usual practice in assessing when new flight routes are likely to be highly controversial, without giving a “reasoned explanation for . .. treating similar situations differently.” W. Deptford Energy, LLC v. FERC, 766 F.3d 10, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2014). In assessing proposed route changes at airports in Boston, Northern California, Charlotte, and Atlanta, the FAA has relied on its general observation that a proposal is likely to be highly controversial if it would increase sound levels by five or more decibels in an area already experiencing average levels of 45- 60 decibels. But here the agency said exactly the opposite and If it looks like a duck... did The practical implication? The FAA is being held to account for the Nixon question—what it know and when did it know it—in relation to how bad the FAA NextGensatellite-based all been bad, and navigation rollouts have been in all prior cities. And because they have be problems at because the FAA did not explain why the prior problems were not likely to Phoenix, the FAA's failure to conduct a full EIS was arbitrary and capricious. of Third, the Transportation Act holdings may provide the most unique and powerful roadmaps whether new routes all. The Court found the FAA failed to consult with the City “in assessing to find the would substantially impair the City’s parks and historic sites,” and “FAA was wrong The key rationale that will cause routes would not substantially impair these protected areas.” consulted with these city the FAA severe heartburn is this: “the FAA cites no evidence that it officials on historic sites and public parks in particular.” consultation duties required. Besides, the FAA cites no evidence that it consulted with these City officials on historic sites and public parks in particular. Thus, the FAA’s consultation process was arbitrarily confined. the right people. It's not just who you consulted with—it's whether you consulted with because the devil is in In other words, the FAA can’t go through the motions in a consultation, the details and in the content of the consultation. Also under the Transportation Act, if the use of a park is so negatively impacted by overflights that it amounts to a taking, the FAA action can only proceed if there is no prudent and feasible alternative to using the park. Here, the problems for the FAA suddenly magnify exponentially. 50 Noise Study—may Reliance on the FAA's go-to holecard—compliance with the NEPA Part 1 is a generally recognized purpose not be sufficient to determine noise impact if “a quiet setting that a Part and attribute” of historic residences, neighborhoods, and sites. The Court agreed this was true 150 alone does not provide adequate information on this required topic. Critically, some neighborhoods might be even where the sites were urban: “even in the heart of a city recognized as quiet oases.” Finally, the Court used the Transportation Act to hit the nail on the head for other impacted that overflights airport communities across the country. In addressing the FAA's argument door with common had already historically occurred in these communities, the Court shut the that flew far less often so the homes sense: “But those earlier flights involved propeller aircraft other words— beneath them might still have been generally recognized as “quiet settings. "In historical uses are not the same as present uses and the FAA can't try to avoid its obligations by claiming it has already made some noise. Thus, it was unreasonable for the agency to rely only on the Part 150 guidelines in concluding that noise from the new flight routes would not substantially impair the affected historic sites. As a result, that conclusion lacks substantial supporting evidence. For both these reasons, we find that the agency’s substantial-impairment analysis was arbitrary and capricious. One Part 150 does not fit all. all—that timing matters. The rule It must be noted that this case comes with a dire warning to action” issues. The problem in is that a petition must be filed within 60 days after FAA “final late. But the Court Phoenix? The routes had been in effect for six months. They were too it was provided a yet another “save” because it found the FAA repeatedly communicated wanted to work with continuing to look into the noise problem, was open to fixing the issue, “reasonable observers to the City and others to find a solution. This led to the conclusion that do so by a court.” In other think the FAA might fix the noise problem without being forced to The Court words, the FAA led the community groups and city down a path of cooperation. this is such clearly did not like this tactic. “While we rarely find a reasonable-grounds exception, “ To identification of nefarious intent: a rare case.” The Court finished with a truly remarkable for conclude otherwise would encourage the FAA to promise to fix the problem just long enough sixty days to lapse and then to argue that the resulting petitions were untimely.” and certainly, the FAA may This case will require some ongoing thought and consideration— well appeal. At first blush, on the outside looking in, it's a winner for long-suffering airport One crew and neighbor communities. Perhaps for now, like the impossible-odds-facing Rogue Rebel Alliance that follows, the Force is now with us—for at least a brief period of time. BIg A LADDER OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION Sherry R. Arnstein The heated controversy over “citizen participation,” United States—has or can have. Between understated “citizen control,” and “maximum feasible involvement euphemisms and exacerbated rhetoric, even scholars of the poor,” has been waged largely in terms of ex- have found it difficult to follow the controversy. To acerbated rhetoric and misleading euphemisms. To the headline reading public, it is simply bewildering. of encourage a more enlightened dialogue, a typology My answer to the critical what question is simply that citizen participation is offered using examples from citizen participation is a categorical term for citizen three fedetal social programs: urban remewal, anti- It is the redistribution of power that enables the which is power. poverty, and Model Cities. The typology, have-not citizens, presently excluded from the political designed to be provocative, is arranged in 2 ladder and economic processes, to be deliberately included in the extent of pattern with each rung corresponding to the future. It is the strategy by which the have-nots join citizens’ power in determining the plan and/or program. in determining how information is shared, goals and The idea of citizen participation is a little policies are set, tax resources are allocated, programs are like eating spinach: no one is against it in principle operated, and benefits like contracts and patronage are parceled out. In short, it is the means by which théy can because it is good for you. Participation of the gov- erned in their government is, in theory, the induce significant social reform which enables them to corner- share in the benefits of the affluent society. stone of democracy—a revered idea that is vigorously applauded by virtually everyone. The applause is re- EMPTY RITUAL VERSUS BENEFIT duced to polite handclaps, however, when this princi- There is a critical difference between going through the ple is advocated by the have-not blacks, Mexican- empty ritual of participation and having the real power Americans, Puerto Ricans, Indians, Eskimos, and whites. needed to affect the outcome of the process. This And when the have-nots define participation as re- difference is brilliantly capsulized in a poster painted distribution of power, the American consensus on the last spring by the French students to explain the fundamental principle explodes into many shades of student-worker rebellion.? (See Figure 1.) The poster outright racial, ethnic, ideological, and political highlights the fundamental point that participation opposition. without redistribution of power is an empty and frus- There have been many recent speeches, articles, and trating process for the powerless. It allows the power- books * which explore in detail who are the have-nots holders to claim that all sides were considered, but of our time, There has been much recent documenta- makes it possible for only some of those sides to benefit. tion of why the have-nots have become so offended and It maintains the status quo. Essentially, it is what has embittered by their powerlessness to deal with the profound inequities and injustices pervading their daily lives. But there has been very little analysis of the content of the current controversial slogan: “citizen participation” or “maximum feasible participation.” In short: What is citizen participation and what is its relationship to the social imperatives of our time? Citizen Participation is Citizen Power Because the question has been a bone of political conten- tion, most of the answers have been purposely buried in innocuous euphemisms like “self-help” or “citizen involvement.” Still others have been embellished with misleading rhetoric like “absolute control” which is something no one—including the President of the Sherry R. Arnstein is Director of Community Development Studies for The Commons, a non-profit research ‘institute in Washington, D.C. and Chicago. She is a former Chick Advisor on Citizen Participation in HUD’s Model Cities Administra- tion and has served as Staff Consultant to the President's FIGURE 1 French Student Poster, In English, I participate; Committee on Juvenile Delinquency, Special Assistant to the you participate; he participates; we participate; Assistant Secretary of HEW, and Washington Editor of Current Magazine. you participate . . . They profit. 216 AIP JOURNAL JULY 1969 can enter into 2 (6) Partnership that enables them to negotiate and engage in trade-offs with traditional Citizen control powerholders. At the topmost rungs, (7) Delegated Power and (8) Citizen Conirol, have-not citizens obtain Degrees the majority of decision-making seats, or full managerial Delegated power of citizen power .power. Obviously, the eight-rung ladder is a simplification, Partnership but it helps to illustrate the point that so many have 6 -— missed—that there are significant gradations of citizen Placation participation. Knowing these gradations makes it possi- ble to cut through the hyperbole to understand the § Degrees increasingly strident demands for participation from the Consultation —- of have-nots as well as the gamut of confusing responses tokenism 4 from the powerholders. Though the typology uses examples from federal informing programs such as urban renewal, anti-poverty, and 3 r— Model Cities; it could just as easily be illustrated in the Therapy church, currently facing demands for power from priests 2 == Nonparticipation and laymen who seek to change its mission; colleges and universities which in some cases have become literal Manipulation battlegrounds over the issue of student power; or public schools, city halls, and police departments (or big busi- list of ness which is likely to be next on the expanding FIGURE 2 Eight Rungs on a Ladder of Citizen Partici- targets). The underlying issues are essentially the same pation ——“nobodies” in several arenas are trying to become “somebodies’ with enough power to make the target institutions responsive to their views, aspirations, and been happening in most of the 1,000 Community Action needs. Programs, and what promises to be repeated in the vast majority of the 150 Model Cities programs. LIMITATIONS OF THE TYPOLOGY The ladder juxtaposes powerless citizens with the Types of Participation and “NonParticipation” powerful in order to di- A typology of eight levels of participation may help in highlight the fundamental analysis of this confused issue. For illustrative visions between them. In actuality, neither the have-nots pur- the powerholders are homogeneous blocs. Each in a ladder pattern nor poses the eight types are arranged of divergent points of view, with each rung corresponding to the extent of citizens’ group encompasses a host significant cleavages, competing vested interests, and power in determining the end product.® (See Figure 2.) The The bottom rungs of the ladder are (1) Manipala- splintered subgroups. justification for using such tion and (2) Therapy. These two rungs describe levels simplistic abstractions is that in most cases the have-nots as a monolithic “sys- of “non-participation” that have been contrived by some really do perceive the powerful to substitute for genuine participation. Their real ob- tem,” and powerholdets actually do view the have-nots of asa sea of “those people,” with little comprehension jective is not to enable people to participate in planning the class and caste differences among them. or conducting programs, but to enable powerholders to “educate” or “cure” the participants. Rungs 3 and 4 It should be noted that the typology does not include to achiev- that allow the have- an analysis of the most significant roadblocks progress to levels of “tokenism™ nots to hear and to have a voice: (3) Informing and ing genuine levels of participation. These roadblocks (4) Consultation. When they are proffered by power- lie on both sides of the simplistic fence. On the power- holders as the total extent of participation, citizens may holders’ side, they include racism, paternalism, and indeed hear and be heard. But under these conditions resistance to power redistribution. On the have-nots’ they lack the power to insure that their views will be side, they include inadequacies of the poor community's socioeconomic infrastructure and knowledge- heeded by the powerful. When participation is re- political and stricted to these levels, there is no followthrough, no base, plus difficulties of organizing a representative “muscle,” hence no assurance of changing the status accountable citizens’ group in the face of futility, quo. Rung (5) Placation, is simply a higher level alienation, and distrust. tokenism because the groundrules allow have-nots to Another caution about the eight separate rungs on the advise, but retain for the powerholders the continued ladder: In the real world of people and programs, there right to decide. might be 150 rungs with less sharp and “pure”distinc- Further up the ladder are levels of citizen power with tions among them. Furthermore, some of the character- increasing degrees of decision-making clout. Citizens istics used to illustrate each of the eight types might be 217 ARNSTEIN applicable to other rungs. For example, employment of The signators are not informed that the $2 millionthe have-nots in a program or on 2 planning staff could per-year center will only refer residents to the same old occur at any of the eight rungs and could represent waiting lines at the same old agencies across town. No either a legitimate or illegitimate characteristic of citi- one is asked if such a referral center is really needed in zen participation. Depending on their motives, power- his neighborhood. No one realizes that the contractor holders can hire poor people to coopt them, to placate for the building is the mayor's brother-in-law, or that them, or to utilize the have-nots’ special skills and the new director of the center will be the same old com- insights,¢ Some mayors, in private, actually boast of munity organization specialist from the urban renewal their strategy in hiring militant black leaders to muzzle agency. them while destroying their credibility in the black After signing their names, the proud grassrooters community. dutifully spread thé word that they have “participated” in bringing a new and wonderful center to the neighbor- Characteristics and Illustrations hood to provide people with drastically needed jobs and It is in this context of power and powerlessness that the health and welfare services. Only after the ribbon- characteristics of the eight rungs are illustrated by cutting ceremony do the members of the neighborhood examples from current federal social programs. council realize that they didn’t ask the important ques- tions, and that they had no technical advisors of their 1. MANIPULATION own to help them grasp the fine legal print. The new In the name of citizen participation, people are placed center, which is open 9 to 5 on weekdays only, actually on rubberstamp advisory committees or advisory boards adds to their problems. Now the old agencies across for the express purpose of “educating” them or engi- town won't talk with them unless they have a pink paper neering their support. Instead of genuine citizen par- slip to prove that they have been referred by “their” ticipation, the bottom rung of the ladder signifies the shiny new neighborhood center. distortion of participation into a public relations vehicle Unfortunately, this chicanery is not a unique example. by powerholders. Instead it is almost typical of what has been perpetrated This illusory form of “participation” initially came in the name of high-sounding rhetoric like “grassroots dinto vogue with urban renewal when the socially elite participation.” This sham lies at the heart of the deep- seated exasperation and hostility of the have-nots were invited by city housing officials to serve on Citizen Advisory Committees (CACs). Another target of ma- toward the powerholders. nipulation were the CAC subcommittees on minority One hopeful note is that, having been so grossly groups, which in theory were to protect the rights of affronted, some citizens have learned the Mickey Mouse Negroes in the renewal program. In practice, these Asa result game, and now they too know how to play. subcommittees, like their parent CACs, functioned of this knowledge, they are demanding genuine levels mostly as letterheads, trotted forward at appropriate of participation to assure them that public programs are times to promote urban renewal plans (in recent years relevant to their needs and responsive to their priorities. known as Negro removal plans). At meetings of the Citizen Advisory Committees, it 2. THERAPY was the officials who educated, persuaded, and advised In some respects group therapy, masked as citizen par- the citizens, not the reverse. Federal guidelines for the ticipation, should be on the lowest rung of the ladder renewal programs legitimized the manipulative agenda because it is both dishonest and arrogant. Its adminis- by emphasizing the terms ‘“information-gathering,” trators—mental health experts from social workers to “public relations,” and “support” as the explicit func- psychiatrists—assume that powerlessness is synonymous tions of the committees. with mental illness. On this assumption, under 2 mas- This style of nonparticipation has since been applied querade of involving citizens in planning, the experts to other programs encompassing the poor. Examples of subject the citizens to clinical group therapy. What this are seen in Community Action Agencies (CAAs) makes this form of “participation” so invidious is that which have created structures called “neighborhood citizens are engaged in extensive activity, but the focus councils” or “neighborhood advisory groups.” These of it is on curing them of their “pathology” rather than bodies frequently have no legitimate function or power. The CAAs use them to “prove” that “grassroots changing the racism and victimization that create their people” are involved in the program. But the program “pathologies.” “the people.” Or it Consider an incident that occurred in Pennsylvania may not have been discussed with may have been described at less than one year ago. When a father took his seriously a meeting in the most ill baby to the emergency clinic of a local hospital, a general terms; “We need your signatures on this pro- him to take posal for a multiservice center which will house, under young resident physician on duty instructed oneroof, doctors from the health department, workers the baby home and feed it sugar water. The baby died from the welfare department, and specialists from the that afternoon of pneumonia and dehydration. The employment service.” overwrought father complained to the board of the local 218 AIP JOURNAL JULY 1969 Community Action Agency. Instead of launching an the official, the citizens accepted the “information” and investigation of the hospital to determine what changes endorsed the agency's proposal to place four lots in the would prevent similar deaths or other forms of mal- white neighborhood.® practice, the board invited the father to attend the CAA's (therapy) child-care sessions for parents, and 4. CONSULTATION promised him that someone would “telephone the hos- Inviting citizens’ opinions, like informing them, can be pital director to see that it never happens again.” a legitimate step toward their full participation. But if Less dramatic, but more common examples of consulting them is not combined with other modes of therapy, masquerading as citizen participation, may be participation, this rung of the ladder is still a sham since seen in public housing programs where tenant groups it offers no assurance that citizen concerns and ideas will are used as vehicles for promoting control-your-child or be taken into account. The most frequent methods used cleanup campaigns. The tenants are brought together for consulting people are attitude surveys, neighborhood to help them “adjust their values and attitudes to those meetings, and public hearings. of the larger society.” Under these groundrules, they When powerholders restrict the input of citizens’ are diverted from dealing with such important matters ideas solely to this level, participation remains just a as: arbitrary evictions; segregation of the housing proj- window-dressing ritual. People are primarily perceived ect; or why is there a three-month time lapse to get a as statistical abstractions, and participation is measured broken window replaced in winter. by how many come to meetings, take brochures home, The complexity of the concept of mental illness in or answer a questionnaire. What citizens achieve in all our time can be seen in the experiences of student/civil this activity is that they have “participated in participa- rights workers facing guns, whips, and other forms of tion.” And what powerholders achieve is the evidence terror in the South. They needed the help of socially that they have gone through the required motions of attuned psychiatrists to deal with their fears and to avoid involving “those people.” paranoia.’ Attitude surveys have become a particular bone of contention in ghetto neighborhoods. Residents are in- 3. INFORMING creasingly unhappy about the number of times per week Informing citizens of their rights, responsibilities, and they are surveyed about their problems and hopes. As options can be’ the most important first step toward one woman put it: “Nothing ever happens with those legitimate citizen participation. However, too frequently damned questions, except the surveyer gets $3 an hour, In some the emphasis is placed on a one-way flow of information and my washing doesn’t get done that day.” —from officials to citizens—with no channel provided communities, residents are so annoyed that they are for feedback and no power for negotiation. Under these demanding a fee for research interviews. conditions, particularly when information is provided at Attitude surveys are not very valid indicators of com- a late stage in planning, people have little opportunity munity opinion when used without other input from for out of anti- to influence the program designed “for their benefit.” citizens. Survey after survey (paid The most frequent tools used for such one-way com- poverty funds) has “documented” that poor housewives munication are the news media, pamphlets, posters, and most want tot-lots in their neighborhood where young children can play safely. But most of the women an- responses to inquiries. Meetings can also be turned into vehicles for one-way swered these questionnaires without knowing what their options were. They assumed that if communication by the simple device of providing supet- they asked for ficial information, discouraging questions, or giving something small, they might just get something useful irrelevant answers. At a recent Model Cities citizen in the neighborhood. Had the mothers known that a planning meeting in Providence, Rhode Island, the topic free prepaid health insurance plan was a possible option, was “tot-lots.”” A group of elected citizen representa- they might not have put tot-lots so high on their wish tives, almost all of whom were attending three to five lists. meetings a week, devoted an hour to a discussion of the A classic misuse of the consultation rung occurred at placement of six tot-lots. The neighborhood is half a New Haven, Connecticut, community meeting held to black, half white. Several of the black representatives consult citizens on a proposed Model Cities grant. noted that four tot-lots were proposed for the white James V. Cunningham, in an unpublished report to district and only two for the black. The city official the Ford Foundation, described the crowd as large and responded with a lengthy, highly technical explanation “mostly hostile: ® about costs per square foot and available property. It Members of The Hill Parents Association de- was clear that most of the residents did not understand manded to know why residents had not partici- his explanation. And it was clear to observers from the pated in drawing up the proposal. CAA Loe Office of Economic Opportunity that other options did Spitz explained that it was merely a proposal for exist which, considering available funds, would have seeking Federal planning funds—that once funds brought about a more equitable distribution of facilities. were obtained, residents would be deeply involved Intimidated by futility, legalistic jargon, and prestige of in the planning. An outside observer who sat in 219 ARNSTEIN the audience described the meeting this way: (in a few cities) as a result of the provision stipulating “Spitz and Mel Adams ran the meeting on their “maximum feasible participation” in poverty programs. own. No representatives of a Hill group mod- Therefore, HUD channeled its physical-social-economic erated or even sat on the stage. Spitz told the rejuvenation approach for blighted neighborhoods 300 residents that this huge meeting was an through city hall. It drafted legislation requiring that example of ‘participation in planning.’ To prove all Model Cities’ money flow to a local City Demonstra- this, since there was a lot of dissatisfaction in the tion Agency (CDA) through the elected city council. audience, he called for a ‘vote’ on each component As enacted by Congress, this gave local city councils final of the proposal. The vote took this form: “Can I veto power over planning and programming and ruled a health see the hands of all those in favor of out any direct funding relationship between community clinic? All those opposed?’ It was a little like groups and HUD. asking who favors motherhood.” HUD required the CDAs to create coalition, policy- It was a combination of the deep suspicion aroused at making boards that would include necessary local power- this meeting and a long history of similar forms of holders to create a comprehensive physical-social plan “window-dressing participation” that led New Haven during the first year. The plan was to be carried out in residents to demand control of the program. a subsequent five-year action phase. HUD, unlike OEO, By way of contrast, it is useful to look at Denver did not require that have-not citizens be included on the where technicians learned that even the best intentioned CDA decision-making boards. HUD's Performance are often unfamiliar with, and even in- among them Standards for Citizen Participation only demanded that sensitive to, the problems and aspirations of the poor. “citizens have clear and direct access to the decision- The technical director of the Model Cities program has making process.” described the way professional planners assumed that Accordingly, the CDAs structured their policy- the residents, victimized by high-priced local storekeep- making boards to include some combination of elected The resi- ers, “badly needed consumer education.” ** officials; school representatives; housing, health, and dents, on the other hand, pointed out that the local welfare officials; employment and police department storekeepers performed a valuable function. Although representatives; and various civic, labor, and business they overcharged, they also gave credit, offered advice, leaders. Some CDAs included citizens from the neighand frequently were the only neighborhood place to borhood. Many mayors correctly interpreted the HUD cash welfare or salary checks. As a result of this con- provision for “access to the decision-making process” as sultation, technicians and residents agreed to substitute the escape hatch they sought to relegate citizens to the the creation of needed credit institutions in the traditional advisory role. neighborhood for a consumer education program. Most CDAs created residents’ advisory committees. An alarmingly significant number created citizens’ policy 5. PLACATION boards and citizens’ policy committees which are totally It is at this level that citizens begin to have some degree misnamed as they have either no policy-making function of influence though tokenism is still apparent. An or only a very limited authority. Almost every CDA example of placation strategy is to place a few hand- created about a dozen planning committees or task forces picked “worthy” poor on boards of Community Action on functional lines: health, welfare, education, housing, Agencies or on public bodies like the board of educa- and unemployment. In most cases, have-not citizens tion, police commission, or housing authority. If they with were invited to serve on these committees along are not accountable to a constituency in the community technicians from relevant public agencies. Some CDAs, and if the traditional power elite hold the majority of of on the other hand, structured planning committees seats, the have-nots can be easily outvoted and outfoxed. technicians and parallel committees of citizens. Another example is the Model Cities advisory and In most Model Cities programs, endless time has been planning committees. They allow citizens to advise or spent fashioning complicated board, committee, and task plan ad infinitum but retain for powerholders the right force structures for the planning year. But the rights to judge the legitimacy or feasibility of the advice. The and responsibilities of the various elements of those degree to which citizens are actually placated, of course, structures are not defined and are ambiguous. Such depends largely on two factors: the quality of technical ambiguity is likely to cause considerable. conflict at the assistance they have in articulating their priorities; and end of the one-year planning process. For at this point, the extent to which the community has been organized citizens may realize that they have once again exten- to press for those priorities. sively “participated” but have not profited beyond the It is not surprising that the level of citizen participa- extent the powerholders decide to placate them. tion in the vast majority of Model Cities programs is at Results of a staff study (conducted in the summer of the placation rung of the ladder or below. Policy- 1968 before the second round of seventy-five planning makers at the Department of Housing and Urban De- grants were awarded) were released in a December velopment (HUD) were determined to return the genie 1968 HUD bulletin.’* Though this public document it of citizen power to the bottle from which it had escaped uses much more delicate and’ diplomatic language, AIP JOURNAL JuLy 1969 220 It also urged CDAs to experiment with subcontracts attests to the already cited criticisms of non-policy- under which the residents’ groups could hire their own making policy boards and ambiguous complicated struc- trusted technicians. tures, in addition to the following findings: negotiate citizen par- A more recent evaluation was circulated in February 1. Most CDAs did not ticipation requirements with residents. : 1969 by OSTI, a private firm that entered into a con- Citizens, drawing on past negative experi- tract with OEO to provide technical assistance and train- 2. with local powerholders, were extremely sus- ences ing to citizens involved in Model Cities programs inthe northeast region of the country. OSTT's report to OEO picious of this new panacea program. They were legiti- corroborates the earlier study. In addition it states: ** mately distrustful of city hall's motives. 3. Most CDAs were not working with citizens’ In practically no Model Cities structure does citi- groups that were genuinely representative of model zen participation mean truly shared decision- neighborhoods and accountable to neighborhood con- making, such that citizens might view themselves stituencies. As in so many of the poverty programs, as “the partners in this program. . . .” those who were involved were more representative of In general, citizens are finding it impossible to the upwardly mobile working-class. Thus their ac- have a significant impact on the comprehensive quiescence to plans prepared by city agencies was not planning which is going on. In most cases the staff likely to reflect the views of the unemployed, the young, planners of the CDA and the planners of existing the more militant residents, and the hard-core poor. agencies are carrying out the actual planning with citizens having a peripheral role of watchdog and, 4. Residents who were participating in as many of their ultimately, the “rubber stamp” of the plan gen- as three to five meetings per week were unaware erated. In cases where citizens have the direct minimum rights, responsibilities, and the options avail- responsibility for generating program plans, the able to them under the program. For example, they did time period allowed and the independent technical not realize that they were not required to accept techni- resources being made available to them are not cal help from city technicians they distrusted. adequate to allow them to do anything more than 5. Most of the technical assistance provided by generate very traditional approaches to the prob- CDAs and city agencies was of third-rate quality, lems they ate attempting to solve. paternalistic, and condescending. Agency technicians In general, little or no thought has been given did not suggest innovative options. They reacted bu- to the means of insuring continued citizen partici- reaucratically when the residents pressed for innovative pation during the stage of implementation. In approaches. The vested interests of the old-line city most cases, traditional agencies are envisaged as the agencies were a major—albeit hidden—agenda. implementors of Model Cities programs and few in planning mechanisms have been developed for encouraging 6. Most CDAs were not engaged that was comprehensive enough to expose and deal with organizational change or change in the method of for in- the roots of urban decay. They engaged in “meetingitis” program delivery within these agencies or and were supporting strategies that resulted in “proj- suring that citizens will have some influence over these agencies as they implement Model Cities ectitis,” the outcome of which was a “laundry list” of . . . traditional to be conducted by traditional programs. programs By and large, people are once again being agencies in the traditional manner under which slums planned for. In most situations the major plan- emerged in the first place. ning decisions are being made by CDA staff and 7. Residents were not getting enough informa- approved in a formalistic way by policy boards. tion from CDAs to enable them to review CDA de- veloped plans or to initiate plans of their own as re- 6. PARTNERSHIP quired by HUD. At best, they were gettingsuperficial At this rung of the ladder, power is in fact redistributed information. At worst, they were not even getting through negotiation between citizens and powetholders. copies of official HUD materials. oe They agree to share planning and decision-making 8. Most residents were unaware of their rights responsibilities through such structures as joint policy to be reimbursed for expenses incurred because of par- boards, planning committees and mechanisms for re- ticipation—babysitting, transportation costs, and so on. solving impasses. After the groundrules have been 9. The training of residents, which would en- established through some form of give-and-take, they able them to understand the labyrinth of the federal- are not subject to unilateral change. state-city systems and networks of subsystems, was an Partnership can work most effectively when there is did not even consider. the item that most CDAs an organized power-base in the community to which These findings led to a new public interpretation of citizen leaders are accountable; when the citizens group HUD's approach to citizen participation. Though the has the financial resources to pay its leaders reasonable requirements for the seventy-five “'second-round” Model honoraria for their time-consuming efforts; and when the group has the resources to hire (and fire) its own City grantees were not changed, HUD's twenty-seven citizen participation repeat- technicians, lawyers, and community organizers. With page technical bulletin on edly advocated that cities share power with residents. these ingredients, citizens have some genuine bargain- 221 ARNSTEIN cies. It has a veto power in that no plans may be sub- ing influence over the outcome of the plan (as long as mitted by the CDA to the both parties find it useful to maintain the partnership). city council until they have been reviewed, and any differences of opinion have been One community leader described it “like coming to city hall with hat on head instead of in hand.” successfully negotiated with the AWC. Representatives of the AWC (which is a federation of neighborhood In the Model Cities program only about fifteen of the into sixteen neighborhood so-called first generation of seventy-five cities have organizations grouped reached some significant degree of power-sharing with “hubs”) may attend all meetings of CDA task forces, residents. In all but one of those cities, it was angry. planning committees, or subcommittees. citizen demands, rather than city initiative, that led to Though the city council has final veto power over the sharing of power.?® The negotiations plan (by federal the AWC believes it has a the negotiated law), citizens who had been enraged by neighborhood constituency that is strong enough to were triggered by previous forms of alleged participation. They were both negotiate any eleventh-hour objections the city council refuse to be “conned” it considers such AWC proposed in- angry and sophisticated enough to might raise when again. They threatened to oppose the awarding of a novations as an AWC Land Bank, an AWC Economic planning grant to the city. They sent delegations to Development Corporation, and an experimental income HUD in Washington. They used abrasive language. maintenance program for 900 poor families. Negotiation took place under a cloud of suspicion and rancor. 7. DELEGATED POWER In most cases where power has come to be shared it Negotiations between citizens and public officials can citizens, not given by the city. There was taken by the also result in citizens achieving dominant decision- is nothing new about that process. Since those who have making authority over a particular plan or program. onto power normally want to hang it, historically it has Model City policy boards or CAA delegate agencies on had to be wrested by the powerless rather than proffered which citizens have a clear majority of seats and genuine by the powerful. specified powers are typical examples. At this level, the Such a working partnership was negotiated by the ladder has been scaled to the point where citizens hold residents in the Philadelphia model neighborhood. Like the significant cards to assure accountability of the pro- most applicants for a Model Cities grant, Philadelphia gram to them. To resolve differences, powerholders it wrote its more than 400 page application and waved need to start the bargaining process rather than respond at a hastily called meeting of community leaders. When to pressure from the other end. those present were asked for an endorsement, they Such a dominant decision-making role has been at- angrily protested the city’s failure to consult them on tained by residents in a handful of Model Cities includ- preparation of the extensive application. A community ing Cambridge, Massachusetts; Dayton, and Columbus, spokesman threatened to mobilize 2 neighborhood pro- Ohio; Minneapolis, Minnesota; St. Louis, Missouri; test against the application unless the city agreed to give Hartford and New Haven, Connecticut; and Oakland, the citizens a couple of weeks to review the application California. and recommend changes. The officials agreed. In New Haven, residents of the Hill neighborhood At their next meeting, citizens handed the city offi- have created a corporation that has been delegated the cials a substitute citizen participation section that Cities plan. The city, power to prepare the entire Model changed the groundrules from a weak citizens’ ad- which received a $117,000 planning grant from HUD, visory role to a strong shared power agreement. Phila- has subcontracted $110,000 of it to the neighborhood delphia’s application to HUD included the citizens’ corporation to hire its own planning staff and consul- substitution word for word. (It also included 2 new tants. The Hill Neighborhood Corporation has eleven citizen prepared introductory chapter that changed the representatives on the twenty-one-member CDA board city's description of the model neighborhood from a which assures it a majority voice when its proposed plan paternalistic description of problems to a realistic analy- is reviewed by the CDA. sis of its strengths, weaknesses, and potentials.) Another model of delegated power is separate and Consequently, the proposed policy-making committee parallel groups of citizens and powerholders, with pro- of the Philadelphia CDA was revamped to give five out vision for citizen veto if differences of opinion cannot of eleven seats to the residents’ organization, which is be resolved through negotiation. This is a particularly called the Area Wide Council (AWC). The AWC interesting coexistence model for hostile citizen groups obtained a subcontract from the CDA for more than too embittered toward city hall—as a result of past $20,000 per month, which it used to maintain the neigh- “collaborative efforts” —to engage in joint planning. bothood organization, to pay citizen leaders $7 per Since all Model Cities programs require approval by meeting for their planning services, and to pay the the city council before HUD will fund them, city coun- salaries of a staff of community organizers, planners, cils have final veto powers even when citizens have the and other technicians. AWC has the power to initiate In Richmond, plans of its own, to engage in joint planning with CDA majority of seats on the CDA Board. committees, and to review plans initiated by city agen- California, the city council agreed to a citizens’ counter- AIP JOURNAL Jury 1969 222 veto, but the details of that agreement are ambiguous to develop a series of economic enterprises ranging from and have not been tested. a novel combination shopping-center-public-housing Various delegated power arrangements are also project to a loan guarantee program for local building emerging in the Community Action Program as a result contractors. The membership and board of the non- of demands from the neighborhoods and OEO’s most profit corporation is composed of leaders of major com- recent instruction guidelines which utged CAAs “to munity organizations in the black neighborhood. exceed (the) basic requirements” for resident participa- 2. Approximately $1 million ($595,751 for the tion.’¢ In some cities, CAAs have issued subcontracts to second’ year) was awarded to the Southwest Alabama resident dominated groups to plan and/or operate one or Farmers Cooperative Association (SWAFCA) in Selma, more decentralized neighborhood program components Alabama, for a ten-county marketing cooperative for like a multipurpose service center or a Headstart pro- food and livestock. Despite local attempts to intimidate included the of force to gram. These contracts usually include an agreed upon the coop (which use stop line-by-line budget and program specifications. They trucks on the way to market), first year membership also usually include a specific statement of the significant the sale grew to 1,150 farmers who earned $52,000 on for example: powers that have been delegated, policy- of their new crops. The elected coop board is composed making; hiring and firing; issuing subcontracts for of two poor black farmers from each of the ten economi- building, buying, or leasing. (Some of the subcontracts cally depressed counties. so broad that they verge on models for citizen are 3. Approximately $600,000 ($300,000 in 2a control.) : supplemental grant) was granted to the Albina Cor- poration and the Albina Investment Trust to create 2 8. CITIZEN CONTROL black-operated, black-owned manufacturing concern us- Demands for community controlled schools, black con- ing inexperienced management and unskilled minority trol, and neighborhood control are on the increase. district. The profit- group personnel from the Albina Though no one in the nation has absolute control, it is making wool and metal fabrication plant will be owned be confused with very important that the rhetoric not by its employees through a deferred compensation trust intent. People are simply demanding that degree of plan. power (or control) which guarantees that participants 4. Approximately $800,000 ($400,000 for the be or residents can govetn a program or an institution, second year) was awarded to the Harlem Common- in full charge of policy and managerial aspects, and be wealth Council to demonstrate that a community-based able to negotiate the conditions under which “outsiders” development corporation can catalyze and implement an may change them, economic development program with broad community A neighborhood corporation with no intermediaries support and participation. After only eighteen months between it and the source of funds is the model most of program development and negotiation, the council frequently advocated. A small number of such experi- will soon launch several large-scale ventures including mental corporations ate already producing goods and/or operation of two supermarkets, an auto service and social services. Several others are reportedly in the repair center (with built-in manpower training pro- development stage, and new models for control will gram), a finance company for families earning less undoubtedly emerge as the have-nots continue to press than $4,000 per year, and a data processing company. for greater degrees of power over their lives. The all black Harlem-based board is already managing Though the bitter struggle for community control of a metal castings foundry. the Ocean Hill-Brownsville schools in New York City Though several citizen groups (and their mayors) has aroused great fears in the headline reading public, use the rhetoric of citizen control, no Model City can less publicized experiments are demonstrating that the meet the criteria of citizen control since final approval have-nots can indeed improve their lot by handling the council. power and accountability rest with the city entire job of planning, policy-making, and managing a Daniel P. Moynihan argues that city councils are that they can do program. Some are even demonstrating representative of the community, but Adam Walinsky all this with just one arm because they are forced to use illustrates the nontepresentativeness of this kind of their other one to deal with a continuing barrage of local represeatation: ** opposition triggered by the announcement that a federal grant has been given to a community group or an all Who . . . exercises “control” through the repre- sentative process? In the Bedford-Stuyvesant ghetto black group. of New York thete are 450,000 people—as many Most of these experimental programs have been capi- as in the entire city of Cincinnati, more than in talized with research and demonstration funds from the the entire state of Vermont. Yet the area has only Office of Economic Opportunity in cooperation with one high school, and 80 per cent of its teen-agers other federal agencies. Examples include: are dropouts; the infant mortality rate is twice the 1. A $1.8 million grant was awarded to the national average; there are over 8000 buildings Hough Area Development Corporation in Cleveland to abandoned by everyone but the rats, yet the area plan economic development programs in the ghetto and received not one dollar of urban renewal funds 223 ARNSTEIN during the entire first 15 years of that program’s helpful: B. H. Bagdikian, In the Midst of Plenty: The Poor in America York: Beacon, 1964); Paul Jacobs, “The operation; the unemployment rate is known only (New Brutalizing of America,” Dissent, X1 (Autumn 1964), p. 423-8; to God. Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power: The Random House, Clearly, Bedford-Stuyvesant has special Politics of Liberation in America (New York: some es: Eldridge Cleaver, Soul on Ice (New York: McGraw-Hill, needs; yet it has always been lost in the midst of 1968); L. J. Duhl, The Urban Condition; People and Policy in the the city’s eight million. In fact, it took a lawsuit Metropolis” (New York: Basic Books, 1963); William H. Grier and P. M. Cobbs, Black Rage (New York: Basic Books, 1968); to win for this vast area, in the year 1968, its Michael Harrington, The Other America: Poverty in the United first Congressman. In what sense can the repre- States (New York: Macmillan, 1962); Peter Marris end Martin sentative system be said to have “spoken for” this Rein, Dilemmas of Social Reform: Poverty and Community Action in the United States (New York: Atherton Press, 1967); Mollie community, during the long years of neglect and Orshansky, "Who's Who Among the Poor: A Demographic View decay? of Poverty,” Social Security Bulletin, XXVII (July 1965), 3-32; and Richard T. Titmuss, Essays on the Welfare State (New Haven: Walinsky’s point on Bedford-Stuyvesant has general Yale University Press, 1968). 2 The poster is one of about 350 produced in May or June 1968 applicability to the ghettos from coast to coast. It is at Atélier Populaire, a graphics center launched by students from therefore likely that in those ghettos where residents the Sorbonne's Ecole des Beaux Art and Ecole des Arts Decoratifs. of a more crude typology I have achieved 3This a significant degree of power in the typology is an outgrowth circulated in March 1967 in a HUD staff discussion paper titled Model Cities planning process, the first-year action plans “Rhetoric and Reality." The earlier typology consisted of eight call for the creation of levels that were less discrete types and did not necessarily suggest will some new community a chronological progression: Inform, Consult, Joint Planning, institutions entirely governed by residents with a speci- Negotiate, Decide, Delegate, Advocate Planning, and Neighbor- fied sum of money contracted to them. If the ground- hood Control. 4For an article of some possible employment strategies, see, rules for these programs are clear and if citizens undet- Edmund M. Burke, “Citizen Participation Strategies,” Journal of pluralistic the American Institute of Planners, XXXIV, No. 5 stand that achieving a genuine place in the (September 1968), 290-1. scene subjects them to its legitimate forms of give-and- 570.5, Department of Housing and Urban Development, take, then these kinds of programs might begin to Workable Program for Community Improvement, Answers on Citi- zen Participation, Program Guide 7, February, 1966, pp. 1 and 6. demonstrate how to counteract the various corrosive 6 David Austin, “Study of Resident Participants in Twenty political and socioeconomic forces that plague the poor. Community Action Agencies,” CAP Grant 9499. 7 Robert Coles, "Social Struggle and Weariness,” Psychiatry, In cities likely to become predominantly black XXVII (November 1964), 305-15. I am also indebted to Daniel through population growth, it is unlikely that strident M. Fox of Harvard University for some of his general insights into citizens’ groups like AWC of Philadelphia will even- therapy being used as & diversion from genuine citizen participation. 8 See, Gordon Fellman, “Neighborhood Protest of an Urban tually demand legal power for neighborhood self- Highway,” Journal of the American Institute of Planners, XXXV, government. Their grand design is more likely to call No. 2 (March 1969), 118-22. 9 James V. Cunningham, “Resident Participation, Unpublished for a black city hall, achieved by the elective process. Report prepared for the Ford Foundation, August 1967, p. 54. In cities destined to remain predominantly white for the On Interview with Maxine Kurtz, Technical Director, Denver foreseeable future, it is quite likely that counterpart 11S, Department of Housing and Urban Development, groups to AWC will press for separatist forms of “Citizen Participation in Model Cities,” Technical Assistance Bulle- neighborhood government that can create and control tin, No. 3 (December 1968). 12 Organization for Social and Technical Innovation, Six-Month decentralized public services such as police protection, Progress Report to Office of Economic Opportunity, Region 1, education systems, and health facilities. Much may February 1, 1969, pp. 27, 28, and 35. 18 In Cambridge, Massachusetts, city hall offered to share power depend on the willingness of city governments to enter- with residents and anticipated the need for a period in which a tain demands for resource allocation weighted in favor representative citizens group could be engaged, and the ambiguities of authority, of the poor, reversing gross imbalances of the past. structure, and process would be resolved. At the re- quest of the mayor, HUD allowed the city to spend several months Among the arguments against community control are: of Model Cities planning funds for community organization activi- ties. office also it supports separatism; it creates balkanization of public During these months, staff from the city manager's helped the residents draft a city ordinance that created a CDA com- services; it is more costly and less efficient; it enables posed of sixteen elected residents and eight appointed public and minority group “hustlers” to be just as opportunistic private agency representatives. This resident-dominated body has the power to hire and fire CDA staff, approve all pv review all and disdainful of the have-nots as their white prede- model city budgets and contracts, set policy, and so forth, The ordinance, which was unanimously passed by the city council also cessors; it is incompatible with merit systems and pro- includes a requirement that all Model City plans must be approve fessionalism; and ironically enough, it can turn out to be by a majority of residents in the neighborhood through a refer- endum. Final approval power rests with the city council by federal a new Mickey Mouse game for the have-nots by allowstatute. ing them to gain control but not allowing them suffi- 141.8, Office of Economic Opportunity, OEQ Instruction, cient dollar resources to succeed.*® These arguments are Participation of the Poor in the Planning, Conduct and Evaluation of Community Action Programs (Washington, D.C.: December 1, not to be taken lightly. But neither can we take lightly 1968), pp. 1-2. the arguments of embittered advocates of community 15 Adam Walinsky, "Review of Maximum Feasible Misunder- standing” by Daniel P. Moynihan, New York Times Book Review, control—that every other means of trying to end their t February 2, 1969. victimization has failed! 16 For thoughtful academic analyses of some of the potentials and pitfalls of emerging neighborhood control ‘models, see, Alan Altshuler, “The Demand For Participation in Large American for the Urban Institute, . Cities,” An Unpublished Paper prepared December 1968; and Hans B. C. Spiegel and Stephen D. Mitten- NOTES thal, "Neighborhood Power and Control, Implications for Urban 1 The literature on poverty and discrimination and their effects Planning,” A Report prepared for the Department of Housingand on people is extensive. As an introduction, the following will be Urban Development, November 1968. 224 AIP JOURNAL JuLy 1969
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