September 29, 2020 
Port of Seattle Commission 
2711 Alaskan Way 
Seattle, WA 98121 
We, as members of the Biometrics External Advisory Group and organizations dedicated to
protecting people's rights and civil liberties, urge the Port of Seattle Commission to reject the
use of invasive face surveillance technology at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. 
On December 10, 2019, the Commission adopted seven principles to guide its decision-making
on if and how biometrics should be used at the Port. These principles are: justified, voluntary,
private, equitable, transparent, legal, and ethical.1 
We do not believe that either the current or the proposed uses of biometrics to identify
travelers on Port property can be implemented in a manner consistent with these
principles. Port staff state that its recommendations "are not meant to suggest that the Port
should implement public-facing biometrics, but rather how to do so in alignment with our
guiding principles."2 The only action that would be aligned with those principles would be to
ban the use of facial recognition technology to identify members of the public by the Port, as
well as by the Port's tenants and contractors.
We respectfully but strongly disagree with the Port's interpretation and application of 
each of these principles. For example, the Port states that using facial recognition is
"equitable"3 if it is "accurate in identifying people of all backgrounds"4 and is "justified"5 if
doing so fulfills a "specific operational need."6 The undersigned members of the Biometrics
External Advisory Group have repeatedly voiced our concerns with such interpretations, noting
that even if facial recognition tools were accurate (which they are not), accuracy does not create
equity and that increasing efficiencies at the Port does not mean that the use of invasive
surveillance technology is justified. 
We urge reevaluation of the principles, which should lead to reconsideration of the
recommendations that justify the procurement and implementation of facial recognition 
technology at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. We have shared that the Port should
not collaborate with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and other entities to implement
invasive face surveillance systems.7 We reiterate that by working with government and private
entities to legitimize facial recognition technology, the Port will be facilitating the infrastructural

1 December 10, 2019  Port of Seattle Commission Regular Meeting, PORT OF SEATTLE (Dec. 10, 2019),
2 Biometrics Policy Recommendations Cover Memo, PORT OF SEATTLE, at 1 (Sept. 25, 2020). 
3 Motion 2019-13: A Motion of the Port of Seattle Commission, PORT OF SEATTLE, at 1 (Dec. 10, 2019),
https://www.portseattle.org/sites/default/files/2019-12/Motion%202019-13__Biometrics%20Principles.pdf. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 2. 
6 Id. 
7 Open Letter to Port of Seattle Commission, ACLU OF WASH. (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.aclu-wa.org/docs/open-letter-port-
seattle-commission. 

1

expansion of powerful and racially biased face surveillance systems that threaten our
constitutionally protected rights and civil liberties.8 
Face surveillance systems should not be used by government agencies such as CBP. In
announcing a recent lawsuit against CBP and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA),
the ACLU stated, "Unlike other forms of identity verification, facial recognition technology can
enable undetectable, persistent, government surveillance on a massive scale. As this technology
becomes increasingly widespread, the government can use it to track individuals' movements
and associations, posing grave risks to privacy and civil liberties. When such a technology is
placed in the hands of agencies like CBP and TSAwhich have been caught tracking and
spying on journalists, subjecting innocent travelers to excessive and humiliating searches, and
targeting and interrogating individuals because of their national origin, religious beliefs, or
political viewswe should all be concerned."9 
We emphasize that face surveillance systems power systemic racism and injustice
whether or not these systems operate accurately. There is a long and ugly history of
government use of surveillance tools to target specific communities. To highlight just a few
examples, our government used IBM's Hollerith punched card machines to illegally surveil and
incarcerate Japanese-Americans during WWII.10 More recently, law enforcement used
automated license plate readers (ALPR) to religiously profile the Muslim community in a
decade-long surveillance program that was eventually struck down as illegal.11 Today, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is using ALPR and facial recognition technology
to track and deport immigrants.12 It is clear that facial recognition technology provides
government agencies with unprecedented surveillance power. 
An increasing number of cities across the U.S. including Portland,13 Boston,14 and San
Francisco,15 have banned public and private16 uses of facial recognition technology,
8 Jennifer Lee, Tell the Port Commission to Push Back Against Face Surveillance, ACLU OF WASH. (Mar. 9, 2020), https://www.aclu-
wa.org/story/tell-port-commission-push-back-against-face-surveillance. 
9 Ashley Gorski, The Government Has a Secret Plan to Track Everyone's Faces at Airports. We're Suing., ACLU (Mar. 12, 2020),
https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/the-government-has-a-secret-plan-to-track-everyones-faces-at-airports-weresuing
/. 
10 Matthew Wills, WWII and the First Ethical Hacker, JSTOR DAILY (Feb. 14, 2017), https://daily.jstor.org/wwii-and-the-first-
ethical-hacker/. 
11 Dia Kayyali, Third Circuit to the City of New York: Being Muslim is not Reasonable Suspicion for Surveillance, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. 
(Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/10/third-circuit-city-new-york-being-muslim-not-reasonable-suspicionsurveillance.
12 Catie Edmonson, ICE Used Facial Recognition to Mine State Driver's License Databases, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/07/us/politics/ice-drivers-licenses-facial-recognition.html. 
13 Portland, Oregon Municipal Code  34.10. Available at https://cdn.vox-
cdn.com/uploads/chorus_asset/file/21868277/704_Sep_9_2TC_TW_Ord_BPS_2__1_.pdf.; Press Release, City of Portland,
City Council approves ordinances banning use of facial recognition technologies by City of Portland bureaus and by private entities in public spaces 
(Sept. 9, 2020), https://www.portland.gov/bps/news/2020/9/9/city-council-approves-ordinances-banning-use-facialrecognition-technologies-city.
Note: Setting an example that we believe that the Port of Seattle Commission should follow, the Portland City Council
considered and rejected a request from the Port of Portland for an exception to the ban to allow use of facial recognition for
passenger processing at the Portland International Airport. See The Identity Project., Portland bans facial recognition by city agencies or
in places of public accommodation, PAPERS PLEASE (Sept. 9, 2020), https://papersplease.org/wp/2020/09/09/portland-bans-facialrecognition-by-city-agencies-or-in-places-of-public-accommodation
/. 
14 Boston, Massachusetts Municipal Code  16-62. Available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6956465-Boston-
City-Council-face-surveillance-ban.html. 
15 San Francisco, California Administrative Code - Acquisition of Surveillance 
Technology. Available at https://www.eff.org/document/stop-secret-surveillance-ordinance-05062019 

2

recognizing that face surveillance tools not only fuel discriminatory surveillance but
also threaten everyone's privacy and civil liberties. Recent state17 and federal proposals18 to
ban facial recognition technology have garnered widespread support as legislators and the
public have become increasingly concerned about the harmful impacts of face surveillance.
The Port of Seattle Commission has a choice to: 
(1)  Reject collaboration with CBP, a sister agency of ICE, and not fund CBP's surveillance
systems. 
(2)  Prohibit use of facial recognition technology and not facilitate the infrastructural
expansion of powerful and racially biased face surveillance technology. 
(3)  Reevaluate the Port's interpretation of and compliance with its principles so that they 
align with the concerns of marginalized communities. 
1. We urge the Port of Seattle Commission to reject participation in, and funding of,
CBP's facial recognition exit and entry programs.
On March 10, 2020, Port Commissioners voted unanimously to collaborate with CBP in
procuring and implementing its facial recognition program for biometric air exit, and did not
take adequate account of the many privacy, civil liberties, and community organizations that
urged the Port to reject participation.19 Instead of listening to serious constituent concerns
about the Port participating in CBP's mass collection of biometric data, Commissioners voted
to authorize a $5.7 million Request for Proposal (RFP)20 to procure and implement a "shareduse"
facial recognition system at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport.21 
Though Port Commissioners stated that they had no choice but to vote yes to collaborate with
CBP,22 the Commission did have a choice to say no. Airports and airlines are not mandated to
participate in or contribute financially to either CBP's biometric air exit or biometric air entry
programs,23 and furthermore, Congress has never authorized the biometric collection of U.S.
citizen data.24 Without explicit authorization, CBP should not be scanning the faces of
Americans as they depart or arrive on international flights, and the Port should not be
facilitating this unauthorized scanning. 
16 Portland, Oregon Municipal Code  34.10, supra note 13. 
17 H.B. 2856, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash., 2020). Available at http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2019-
20/Pdf/Bills/House%20Bills/2856.pdf#page=1 
18 Press Release, Ed Markey, Senators Markey And Merkley, And Reps. Jayapal, Pressley To Introduce Legislation To Ban
Government Use Of Facial Recognition, Other Biometric Technology (June 5, 2020), 
https://www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-releases/senators-markey-and-merkley-and-reps-jayapal-pressley-to-introducelegislation-to-ban-government-use-of-facial-recognition-other-biometric-technology.
19 March 10, 2020  Port of Seattle Commission Regular Meeting, PORT OF SEATTLE (Mar. 10, 2020),
https://meetings.portseattle.org/index.php?option=com_meetings&view=meeting&Itemid=358&id=1894&active=play. 
20 Solicitation Detail: SEA Airport Biometric Air Exit System, PORT OF SEATTLE (Mar. 16, 2020),
https://hosting.portseattle.org/sops/#/Solicitations/Detail/c1451f2a-7544-ea11-8141-005056bd5ab4. 
21 March 10, 2020  Port of Seattle Commission Regular Meeting, supra note 19, at Item 8a Biometric Air Exit Memo. 
22 Feb 25, 2020  Port of Seattle Commission Regular Meeting, PORT OF SEATTLE (Feb. 25, 2020),
https://meetings.portseattle.org/index.php?option=com_meetings&view=meeting&Itemid=358&id=1892&active=play. 
23 Marc Rotenberg et al., Comments of the Electronic Privacy Information Center to the Department of Homeland Security Data Privacy and
Integrity Advisory Committee, EPIC (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.epic.org/apa/comments/EPIC-Comments-DHS-DPIAC-Face-
Rec-ReportDec-2018.pdf. 
24 See Harrison Rudolph et. al, Not Ready for Takeoff: Face Scans at Airport Departure Gates, GEO. L. CTR ON PRIV. & TECH. (Dec. 21,
2017), https://www.airportfacescans.com/.

3

Additionally, we disagree with the Port's conclusion that the Port's participation in CBP's face
surveillance program will give the Port greater control over the program's implementation.
Commissioners state that by owning and operating the facial recognition systems in use, the
Port will be able to provide the public with clear signage, increasing the opportunity for
informed consent and mitigating harm from CBP's activities.25 Unfortunately, the Port's
decision to work with CBP will have exactly the opposite effect. By voting to authorize the RFP
on March 10, 2020, Commissioners agreed to comply with CBP's "Biometric Air Exit Business
Requirements," which require the Port to install only CBP-approved signage, even if the signage
is misleading or incorrect.26 The Port would have more power to mitigate harm and provide the
public with clear signage by rejecting participation in CBP's facial recognition program. 
Our state has sent a clear message against Washington's collaboration with CBP. Over the past
two years, Washington's state legislature has passed the Keep Washington Working Act and the
Courts Open to All Act, which together prohibit state agencies, local law enforcement, and
court stakeholders from collaborating with CBP.27 The Port of Seattle Commission would be
better aligned with statewide work in Washington by rejecting collaboration with CBP in its
procurement and implementation of face surveillance systems. 
We urge the Port of Seattle Commission to reverse its decision to participate in CBP's
biometric air exit program. Additionally, we urge the Commission to vote no and reject
participation in CBP's biometric air and cruise entry program. 
2.  We urge the Port of Seattle Commission to prohibit use of facial recognition
technology by private entities. 
The Port of Seattle should prohibit business tenants such as airlines from integrating with
CBP's Traveler Verification Service (TVS)the agency's "Identity as a Service" biometrics
system.28 The Port should not enable private industry to aid the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and CBP (DHS's largest law enforcement agency) by allowing it to implement
biometrics using CBP's TVS. When Port tenants integrate with CBP's TVS architecture, it is
impossible to separate "private" or non-federal surveillance from federal government
surveillance of travelers. Travelers may think that they are having their photo taken at a selfservice
kiosk solely for use by the airport or airline. But in reality, that photo will also be shared
with DHS and CBP. 
The Port, airlines, and contractors should not obscure the role of DHS and CBP by collecting
facial images on their behalf. The Privacy Act,29 as discussed further below, requires that if an
individual's personal information is to be used by a federal agency, it must be collected by that
25 March 10, 2020  Port of Seattle Commission Regular Meeting, supra note 19. 
26 Biometric Air Exit Business Requirements Version 2.0, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, at 9, Item 8 (Jan. 2020),
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2020-Jul/Exit%20BRD2__Redacted_0.pdf. 
27 See Keep Washington Working, E.2.S.S.B 5497, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash., 2019). Available at 
http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2019- 20/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/Senate/5497-S2.SL.pdf?q=20200401125832.;
See Courts Open to All, S.H.B. 2567, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash., 2020). Available at 
http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2019-20/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/House/2567-S.SL.pdf?q=20200401094053. 
28 Biometric Air Exit Business Requirements Version 2.0, supra note 26. 
29 5 U.S.C.  552a (2010). Available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2018-title5/pdf/USCODE-2018-
title5-partI-chap5-subchapII-sec552a.pdf. 

4

agency directly from that individual. The best way to provide travelers with clear notice that
facial images are being passed on to DHS is to require that any such images be collected by
identifiable, uniformed DHS staff, using DHS equipment, at DHS's expense. 
The Port has significant control over whether and how private companies can implement
biometrics at Port facilities, and it should exercise this control to prohibit private entity
collaboration with DHS and CBP. 
Additionally, the Port should prohibit private entities from using private-sector proprietary
facial recognition systems at Port facilities. We are alarmed that the recommendations from
Port staff highlight potential use of facial recognition for purposes including, but not limited to, 
targeted advertising using dynamic signage, payment at retail stores or restaurants, access to
rental cars or airline passenger lounges, ticketing and bag check, and boarding of departing
flights and cruise ships.30 The Port should reject the infrastructural expansion of face
surveillancenot invite it in.
We emphasize that use of face surveillance systems will inevitably have disparate impacts on
marginalized groups, whether or not the technology operates accurately. However, it is
important to recognize that inaccurate and biased facial recognition systems have in many cases,
life-or-death consequences. Use of face surveillance has implicated people in crimes they have
not committed, as in the case of Robert Julian-Borchak Williams, a Black man who was wrongly
arrested and jailed due to a false facial recognition match.31 Indeed, multiple expert studies have
found facial recognition technology to be less accurate at identifying women, youth, trans and
gender non-conforming people, and people of color, increasing the risk of false matches. A
December 2019 study from the National Institute of Standards and Technology on Face
Recognition Software found that false positives are up to 100 times more likely for Asian and
African faces when compared to white faces.32 We underscore that facial recognition causes
disparate impacts when it is inaccurate, and it will also lead to harm even if perfectly accurate, as
the technology will continue to be deployed disproportionately to surveil marginalized
communities.
Finally, it is important that the Port prohibit its tenants from using proprietary facial recognition
systems because private surveillance often fuels government surveillance. With companies
frequently building and equipping government agencies with face surveillance tools, as well as
with the information gathered from such tools, it has become increasingly difficult to
distinguish between private and government surveillance. For example, companies such as
Clearview AI have provided facial recognition services to thousands of companies as well as to
government agencies like ICE.33 Allowing private entities to use proprietary facial recognition
systems at Port facilities will bolster both private and government use of invasive face
surveillance technology. 
30 Port of Seattle Public-Facing Biometrics Policy: Biometrics For Traveler Functions by Private Sector Entities Using Proprietary Systems
Recommendations, PORT OF SEATTLE, at 6 (July 24, 2020), https://www.portseattle.org/sites/default/files/2020-
08/Public_Facing_Biometrics_for_Traveler_Functions_Using_Private_Propietary_Systems_DRAFT_200724.pdf. 
31 Kashmir Hill, Wrongfully Accused by an Algorithm, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/24/technology/facial-recognition-arrest.html. 
32 Patrick Grother et al., Face Recognition Vendor Test (FRVT) Part 3: Demographic Effects, U.S. DEP'T. OF COM., NAT'L
INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH. (Dec. 2019), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2019/NIST.IR.8280.pdf. 
33 Kim Lyons, ICE just signed a contract with facial recognition company Clearview AI, THE VERGE (Aug. 14, 2020) 
https://www.theverge.com/2020/8/14/21368930/clearview-ai-ice-contract-privacy-immigration. 

5

Many people are recognizing that private uses of face surveillance are as concerning as
government uses. Recently, Portland became the first jurisdiction to ban private entity use of
facial recognition technologies in places of public accommodationwhich includes airports.34 
The Port of Seattle should follow suit and ban private entity use of facial recognition
technologies at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. 

3.  We urge the Port of Seattle to reevaluate its interpretation of and compliance with its
principles. 
The undersigned members of the Biometrics External Advisory Group have repeatedly raised
serious concerns with the Port's interpretation of the seven principles it has adopted to guide its
decision-making on biometrics. 
I.     Justified 
The Port states that facial recognition use is "justified" if the technology is used only for a clear
intended purpose, it furthers a specific operational need or benefit, and it is not used for "mass
surveillance."35 
First, use of a surveillance tool is not justified just because it is used for a clear and intended
purpose. Even if the intended purpose is ostensibly innocuous, use of powerful surveillance
technologies can pose risks to people's civil rights and civil liberties. For example, recently in
San Diego, police looked for Black Lives Matter protesters by searching records of smart
streetlights. These streetlights were originally pitched as a way to gather pedestrian and vehicle
data for the purpose of city planning. However, these streetlights have increasingly served the
purpose of law enforcement, as evidenced by San Diego Police Department using this footage
to surveil and prosecute protesters.36 
Second, the Port's definition of "justified" conflates operational benefit and operational need.
For some use cases, such as biometric air and cruise entry, the recommendations state that
"justified" means meeting an operational need,37 and in other use cases such as for private
proprietary systems, the recommendations state that "justified" means creating an operational
benefit.38 However, all use cases, including the use of facial recognition for air exit, air and
cruise entry, and targeted advertising are apparently benefit-based rather than operationally
necessary. "Operational need" implies that facial recognition is essential to operations. This is
not the case for any of the use cases proposed. 
Third, the Port states that use of facial recognition is justified if it is not used for "mass
surveillance." However, the Port has too narrowly defined "mass surveillance" as "scanning
34 See San Francisco, California Administrative Code - Acquisition of Surveillance 
Technology, supra note 15. 
35 Motion 2019-13: A Motion of the Port of Seattle Commission, supra note 3, at 1-2. 
36 Jesse Marx, Police Used Smart Streetlight Footage to Investigate Protesters., Voice of San Diego (June 29, 2020),
https://www.voiceofsandiego.org/topics/government/police-used-smart-streetlight-footage-to-investigate-protesters/ 
37 Biometrics Policy Recommendations Cover Memo, supra note 2, at 57. 
38 Id. at 15. 

6

large groups of people without lawful purpose, rather than use on one person at a time with
their active participation."39 Logging of individuals' movements and when, where, how and with
whom they travel, whether by air or sea or otherwise, is per se surveillance. "Surveillance," or
"the act of observing persons or groups,"40 does not depend on whether or not it is done
overtly or covertlyboth can constitute an invasion of privacy. The Port's proposed use of
facial recognition for biometric entry/exit and its proposal to allow private entities to use both
government and proprietary facial recognition systems would be considered "mass" or "bulk"
surveillance as defined by academics,41 technical experts,42 and governmental entities.43 Mass
surveillance can in some cases be lawful and overt, but still pose threats to people's privacy and
civil liberties. 
II.     Voluntary 
The Port states that facial recognition use is "voluntary" if an "opt-in or "opt-out" procedure is
provided and unintended image capture is prevented.44 
However, as previously noted, the Port's participation in CBP's biometric air exit program
expressly prohibits the Port from having control over signage to notify people of their right to
not have their face surveilled. Even though U.S. citizens technically have the right to opt out of
CBP's face surveillance programs, CBP has frequently failed to provide accurate information to
travelers regarding their opt-out rights. 
A recent report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that CBP's privacy
noticeswhich are intended to provide travelers with information on procedures to opt out
"were not always current or complete, provided limited information on how to request to opt

39 Id. at 31. 
40 Surveillance: Definition from Nolo's Plain-English Law Dictionary, LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/surveillance (last visited Sept. 24, 2020). 
41 Seda Grses, Arun Kundnani, and Joris Van Hoboken, Crypto and Empire: The Contradictions of Counter-surveillance Advocacy, 38
MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC'Y 576 (2016). Available at https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0163443716643006. 
42 "Based in part on briefings from the IC [Intelligence Community], the committee adopted a definition better suited to
understanding the trade-off between civil liberties and effective intelligence: If a significant portion of the data collected is not
associated with current targets, it is bulk collection; otherwise, it is targeted." From National Research Council, Bulk Collection of
Signals Intelligence: Technical Options 2 (2015). Available at https://www.microsoft.com/en-
us/research/uploads/prod/2019/09/Bulk-Collection-of-Signals-Intelligence.pdf. 
43 "On 9 March 2004, the European Parliamen t (2004) declared that any form of mass surveillance was unjustified and that only
targeted measures were justifiable. Targeted surveillance refers to the surveillance of a specific individual (or individuals) on a
case-by-case basis, based on reasonable suspicion (or probable cause). This type of surveillance was only authorized if it
included appropriate safeguards such as the requirement of search warrants or court orders. Any measure that did not meet
these requirements of surveillance is - and in the case of the European Parliament was - considered unjustified." ... "Shortly
after the Madrid bombings (which occurred on 11 March 2004), however, this view changed. The European Council (2004)'s
statement, in the Declaration on Combating Terrorism (adopted on the 25th of March 2004), on the urgency and necessity to
adopt measures of mass surveillance clearly attests to this. In particular, the Declaration on Combating Terrorism called for the
creation of "passenger name record" (PNR) checks on all flights in and out of the European Union (whereby the personal
information of passengers is recorded, stored and transferred to authorities in the United States upon request), IDs, visas, and
passports with biometric identifiers (e.g. digital fingerprints and retinal scans), and the wide retention of communications data.
The mass surveillance of movement (PNR and biometric IDs) and of communications (data retention) were now all said to be
justified." From Marie Helen Maras, The social consequences of a mass surveillance measure: What happens when we become the 'others'?, 40
INT'L JOURNAL OF LAW, CRIME, AND JUSTICE 65 (2012) Available at 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S175606161100070X. 
44 Motion 2019-13: A Motion of the Port of Seattle Commission, supra note 3, at 2. 

7

out of facial recognition, and were not always available."45 The GAO also found that some of
CBP's privacy notices were outdated and contained wrong or inconsistent information.46 
Moreover, there have been documented cases where individuals have been denied their right to
opt-out. For example, in December 2019, a CBP officer incorrectly told an ACLU attorney
crossing from Mexico into the U.S. that he did not have the right to opt out of biometric air
entry.47 
Furthermore, some academics argue that valid consent is not even possible in the context of
face surveillance. Researchers Selinger and Hartzog have stated that "[o]ne reason consent to
facial recognition is highly suspect is that people do not and largely cannot possess an
appropriate level of knowledge about the substantial threats that facial recognition technology
poses to their own autonomy Even if some people withhold consent for face surveillance,
others will inevitably give it. Rules that facilitate this kind of permission will normalize behavior,
entrench organizational practices, and fuel investment in technologies that will result in a net
increase of surveillance. Expanding a surveillance infrastructure will increase the number of
searches that occur which in itself, will have a chilling effect over time as law enforcement and
industry slowly but surely erode our collective and individual obscurity."48 
III.     Private 
The Port states that facial recognition is "private" if data collected by facial recognition
technology are stored only if needed, for no longer than required by law, and protected from
unauthorized access.49 
However, abiding by minimum data protection standards does not mean that the Port's use of
facial recognition technology provides people with adequate privacy. In Biometrics External
Advisory Group meetings, the Port has admitted that it has no control over what CBP does
with the data it collects and with whom it shares the data. 
CBP claims that airlines will be restricted in their retention and use of facial images by contracts
with CBP. But none of those contracts have been disclosed, even when requested pursuant to
the Freedom Of Information Act.50 According to the aforementioned GOA report, "as of May
2020, CBP had audited only one of its more than 20 commercial airline partners and did not
have a plan to ensure that all partners are audited for compliance with the program's privacy
requirements."51 It does not appear that the Port has audited, or would have any way to audit,
compliance with contracts between airlines and CBP. Additionally, such contracts would be
enforceable only by CBP itself, not by the Port or third parties. 
45 Facial Recognition: CBP and TSA are Taking Steps to Implement Programs, but CBP Should Address Privacy and System Performance Issues,
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, at 39 (Sept. 2020), https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/709107.pdf. 
46 Id. at 39- 40 
47 Shaw Drake, A Border Officer Told Me I Couldn't Opt Out of the Face Recognition Scan. They Were Wrong., ACLU 
(Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.aclu.org/news/immigrants-rights/a-border-officer-told-me-i-couldnt-opt-out-of-the-facerecognition-scan-they-were-wrong
/ 
48 Evan Selinger and Woodrow Hartzog, The Inconsentability of Facial Surveillance, 66 LOYOLA LAW REVIEW 101 (2020), Available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3557508. 
49 Motion 2019-13: A Motion of the Port of Seattle Commission, supra note 3, at 2. 
50 See Edward Hasbrouck, Unanswered FOIA request to CBP, PAPERS PLEASE (July 16, 2018),
https://papersplease.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/biometric-partnership-FOIA.pdf. 
51 Facial recognition: CBP and TSA are Taking Steps to Implement Programs, but CBP Should Address Privacy and System Performance Issues, 
supra note 46. 

8

Given all of the above, it cannot be said that the recommendations for the proposed uses of
facial recognition will protect people's privacy. 
IV.    Equitable 
The Port states that facial recognition use is "equitable" if it is "reasonably accurate at
identifying people of all backgrounds," and if systems are in place to treat mismatching issues.52 
First, we reiterate that equity cannot be simplified as accuracy. Face surveillance systems fuel
systemic racism and discriminatory policing, whether or not these systems operate accurately.
Second, under the Port's definition of "equitable," it is unclear at what level of accuracy it will
be acceptable to use facial recognition. Relative differences in accuracy rates between different
groups may lead to discrimination, even if the system is "highly accurate," on average. 
V.    Transparent 
The Port states that facial recognition use is "transparent" if use of biometric technology for
passenger processing at Port facilities is communicated to visitors and travelers and if
individuals are notified about any collection of their biometric data and how that data may be
used. The Port also states that reports on the performance and effectiveness of the technology
should be made public.53 
However, facial recognition use cannot be truly transparent unless the Port knows and can
share with the public with which entities people's data are being shared and for what purposes
people's data are being used. Unfortunately, because the Port cannot know what CBP does with
people's data and with which third parties the data are shared, the Port cannot guarantee
transparency. 
VI.    Lawful 
The Port states that facial recognition is lawful if use complies with all laws including privacy
laws and laws prohibiting discrimination or illegal search against individuals or groups.54 
The Port or the Port's airline tenants collaborating with CBP would likely violate the Privacy
Act, a federal law mandating that data be collected directly from individuals by a federal agency
if the data are used as part of the basis of making decisions about access to federal rights and
privileges (such as federally-licensed air travel).55 
The Privacy Act also prohibits collection of information concerning the exercise of rights
protected by the First Amendment without explicit statutory authorization. The First
Amendment protects "the right of the people peaceably to assemble"56 and records of when,
52 Motion 2019-13: A Motion of the Port of Seattle Commission, supra note 3, at 2. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 5 U.S.C.  552a (2010), supra note 29. 
56 U.S. Const. amend. I. Available at https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/amendment-1/. 

9

where, and with whom we travel are records of how we exercise rights protected by the First
Amendment. Neither CBP nor TSA has explicit statutory authority to collect facial images of
U.S. citizens or domestic travelers, and thus, collection of this information is prohibited by the
Privacy Act. 
By collecting facial images and sending them to CBP, the Port or airlines operating at the Port
would potentially be complicit in CBP's violation of federal law. The Port should not facilitate
CBP's unlawful outsourcing of personal data collection. 
VII.    Ethical 
The Port states that facial recognition use is "ethical" if actions respect key moral principles that
include honesty, fairness, equality, dignity, diversity, and individual rights. 
Respectfully, there are serious ethical questions regarding collaboration with CBP, an agency
with a long history of abuse,57 to build a powerful surveillance system. Face surveillance systems
violate everyone's privacy, and especially violate the dignity and rights of communities that
continue to be targeted by law enforcement. Expanding face surveillance systems will
exacerbate systemic racism. In order to abide by this principle, the Port should refuse to
collaborate with CBP and reject facilitating the growth of both private and government face
surveillance infrastructure. 
We urge the Port of Seattle Commission to reject collaboration with CBP, prohibit all
use of facial recognition technology at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, and
reevaluate its interpretation of and compliance with the aforementioned principles
guiding decision-making on if and how biometrics should be used at the Port. 

Signed, 
ACLU of Washington 
Advocacy for Principled Action in Government 
Asia Pacific Cultural Center 
Asian Counseling and Referral Service (ACRS) 
Casa Latina 
Church Council of Greater Seattle 
Coalition of Seattle Indian-Americans 
Council on American Islamic Relations Washington (CAIR-WA) 
Densho 
Eastside for All 
El Centro de la Raza 
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) 
Entre Hermanos 
Faith Action Network (FAN) 
Fight for the Future 
57 US: Stop Using Untrained, Abusive Agencies at Protests, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 5, 2020), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/05/us-stop-using-untrained-abusive-agencies-protests. 

10

Freedom to Read Foundation 
Indivisible Eastside 
Indivisible Plus Washington 
Indivisible Whidbey 
InterIm Community Development Association (InterIm CDA) 
Japanese American Citizens League (JACL)  Seattle Chapter 
John T. Williams Organizing Committee 
La Resistencia 
Latino Community Fund of Washington 
Legacy of Equality Leadership & Organizing (LELO) 
MAPS-AMEN (American Muslim Empowerment Network) 
MediaJustice 
Mijente 
Northwest Immigrant Rights Project 
OneAmerica 
Planned Parenthood Votes Northwest and Hawai'i 
Puget Sound Sage 
Real Change 
The Identity Project 
Transit Riders Union 
Urban League of Metropolitan Seattle 
Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (WACDL) 
Washington Defender Association (WDA) 










11