October 21, 2020 

Commission Task Force on Policing & Civil Rights Co-Chair Bookda Gheisar 
Commission Task Force on Policing & Civil Rights Co-Chair Delmas Whittaker 
Oversight, Accountability, Racial Equity & Civil Rights Subcommittee Co-Chair Marin Burnett 
Oversight, Accountability, Racial Equity & Civil Rights Subcommittee Co-Chair Anne Levinson 
Mutual Aid Subcommittee Co-Chair Milton Ellis 
Mutual Aid Subcommittee Co-Chair John Hayes 
Use of Force Subcommittee Co-Chair Sam Pailca 
Use of Force Subcommittee Co-Chair Veronica Valdez 
Diversity in Recruitment and Hiring Subcommittee Co-Chair Erick Singh 
Diversity in Recruitment and Hiring Subcommittee Co-Chair Jessica Sullivan 
Training and Development Subcommittee Co-Chair Acting Deputy Chief Sean Gillebo 
Budget, Roles & Equipment Subcommittee Co-Chair Sofia Mayo 

Commission Task Force on Policing & Civil Rights Status Update 
21CP Solutions, LLC, is pleased to submit this first status report reflecting the initial six 
weeks of engagement with the Port of Seattle. While it has been a very busy time, this report must
be prefaced by noting the very early stage of this process. Indeed, this report is being drafted on
shifting sands  we received policy updates that related to some of our initial observations as we
were finalizing the document. Accordingly, the purpose of this report is to provide an update on
progress, identify potential barriers to success, and provide initial recommendations for areas to be
further explored. 
The timeline below was created by the Task Force, and, while not prescriptive due to the
agile and developing nature of this project, it serves as an excellent frame for where we are. 




1

1.   Task Force Engagement 
On September 8, 2020, the Port of Seattle had a "kick off" to formally begin the Task Force
work and to introduce the Port Commissioners, the Task Force members, and the 21CP
consultants. 
On September 18, 2020, 21CP and the Task Force held a planning meeting to level-set and
prepare for initial meetings with the subcommittee co-chairs. The Task Force and 21CP discussed
the approach to the initial assessment stage for the three active subcommittees (Use of Force,
Oversight, Accountability, Racial Equity, and Civil Rights ("Oversight"), and Mutual Aid). Key takeaways
from that meeting include: 
The Oversight assessment should include: a review of how complaints by members of the
public are handled, including internal processes, and outward facing resources (information,
accessibility, language options); how internal complaints by officers  particularly raciallymotivated
conduct - are managed; whether additional external oversight is required; an
inquiry into the disciplinary process and civil lawsuits; internal equity and procedural justice
for all employees, particularly officers of color and other underrepresented demographics in
the police service;1 and across all protocols, how fear of (and actual) retaliation and reprisal is
addressed and managed. 

1 21CP discourages the use of "police force" as an operating term, preferring "police service," which better represents
the purpose of policing agencies. 
21CP Solutions  Status Update                                                     2

The Use of Force assessment should include a review of policy, specifically whether changes
are needed to policies, practices or protocols regarding the use of weapons and tactics used
to manage and disperse crowds, lethal force/restraint, and crisis situations. Additionally, the
assessment should examine current training and opportunities to improve training to provide
officers with alternative options to the use of force across contexts. 
The Mutual Aid assessment should include a review of when and how the Port Police
engage in mutual aid, the protocols that guide those engagements, and the operating
agreements; how often mutual aid agreements are reviewed and updated; and what
accountability measures are in place during Mutual Aid engagements (recognizing this will
have overlap with the Oversight subcommittee). 
Process and roles for Task Force Staff and 21CP were discussed at length, with a follow-up
meeting with the Task Force held on September 30, 2020. Importantly, 21CP will take the
lead in suggesting areas of exploration to each committee, with the goal of focusing on the
most critical issues and ensuring that any "mission creep" is intentional. Inevitably, as this
project progresses, there will be many areas that could be included, but it will be important
to keep the process on task. As discussed, the priority will be on depth, not width, in keeping
with the areas outlined in the motion creating the task force. Collateral issues will be flagged
along the way. 
To this end, 21CP will work on setting the substance for subcommittee agendas in
collaboration with the committee co-chairs, will facilitate the subcommittee meetings, and
will create minutes reflecting the subcommittee work, while preserving the anonymity of
subcommittee members to encourage open dialogue. Placing this body of work on 21CP will
also provide visibility across the subcommittees, allowing 21CP to help deconflict overlap
issues. 
On September 25, 2020, 21CP met with the co-chairs of the three active subcommittees: 
Mutual Aid, Use of Force, and Oversight. 21CP drafted work plans and initial agendas for each of
the three subcommittees and later met separately with the co-chairs of each group to prepare for the
first round of subcommittee meetings. Subcommittee co-chairs scheduled regular meeting dates for
the upcoming months and communicated with their subcommittee members to update them on
steps taken in the assessment, share the meeting schedules, and provide a copy of the work plan for
each subcommittee and agendas for the initial three subcommittee meetings held between October
6th and 15th.At each meeting, the work of 21CP to date was discussed generally and more
specifically where there was particular relevance to a subcommittee. Additionally, each 
subcommittee's work plan was reviewed, meeting logistics were discussed, and the group identified 
next steps in their support of the overarching assessment. Topics discussed at the individual
meetings included: 

21CP Solutions  Status Update                                                     3

The Mutual Aid Subcommittee discussed 21CP's initial document request for mutual aid
agreements with jurisdictions contiguous to Port properties and with task forces, such as the
Valley Civil Disturbance Unit. State law and POSPD policy on mutual aid were reviewed
and the scope of mutual aid for purposes of the subcommittee's work was considered. The
group discussed pro-immigration demonstrations in late January 2017 that involved mutual
aid from other jurisdictions and the after-action review by the POSPD related to the event
was sought by 21CP and posted on SharePoint for members to review and discuss at a later
meeting. 
Prior to the first meeting of the Use of Force Subcommittee, 21CP made an extensive
document request related to the issue, including a request for handbooks or other written
procedures that supplement use of force policy, details about POSPD use of force review
boards and any officer-involved shooting or fatality, and the training curriculum, including
de-escalation training. The co-chairs noted that the work of the subcommittee, under
Motion 2020-15 and initial direction from the Task Force, focuses on use of force related to
crowd management and crisis response. They recommended that the subcommittee also
consider more routine use of force  information that 21CP was indeed already in the
process of pursuing  and Biased Policing. Both topics have been added to the
subcommittee's work plan. During the first meeting of this group, 21CP provided an
introduction to use of force legal concepts and summarized forward leaning, evidence based
policies that create expectations for officers using force that are higher than the legal
justification floor. The subcommittee expressed interest in connecting use of force subtopics 
and 21CP's observations/recommendations with specific values, including clarifying the
focus of all police contacts on the respect for the sanctity of human life.
The Oversight, Accountability, Racial Equity, & Civil Rights Subcommittee (Oversight
Subcommittee) has a particularly broad scope of work and the co-chairs asked that 21CP
identify various approaches to each topic (oversight, accountability, racial equity, and civil
rights) that could be used to further prioritize the work and maximize contributions of the
subcommittee to the assessment. 21CP provided an overview of POSPD's complaint and
discipline system, along with a summary of the various policies and provisions that impact
the system, including POSPD's Policy Manual and relevant procedural/training guidelines,
the Port's Code of Ethics & Workplace Conduct, collective bargaining agreements and
relevant attachments, and the Port of Seattle Police Civil Service Rules. While the issue of
Qualified Immunity is assigned to this subcommittee, the co-chairs have suggested that
subcommittee members consider referring the question of whether the Port should take a
position on qualified immunity to the Advocacy Subcommittee. The co-chairs also suggested
that, given relatively low numbers of use of force and other policing incidents for the
POSPD and the difficulty of establishing racial inequities for each area of the assessment,
the Task Force should make an assumption of racial impact of policies, procedures, and

21CP Solutions  Status Update                                                     4

practices across the board, with the Task Force and subcommittees working to identify ways
to mitigate the assumed racial disparities. 
Regular meetings have been scheduled by the Task Force co-chairs with 21CP to discuss
progress in the engagement, ensure that milestones are continually being met, and to address any
concerns that may arise. Some of the meetings will involve the whole subcommittee and some will
likely be planning sessions with smaller groups. 
The subcommittee calendar includes past and future meetings as follows: 
Use of Force            Oversight             Mutual Aid 
10/15                  10/9                  10/14 
10/29                 10/20                 10/30 
11/12                  11/3                  11/13 
12/102                 11/17                 11/24 
12/1                   12/9 
12/15                 12/16 
This schedule is in alignment with the draft schedule created by the Task Force, set forth
below. 
Phase 1           Phase 2         Phase 3
Task Force mtg
Subcommittees C,D,E,G   Subcommittees A,B  Subcommittees F,H
DRAFT Policing Motion                 Jan 22
18 weeks          12 weeks        12 weeks
Subcommittee Meeting structure          Phase 1 Recommendations       7-9 meets         5-7 meets       4-6 meets
Feb 1                     Sept-Jan           Dec-Mar        Feb-May
(highly complex)    (moderately complex)  (mildly complex)
Task Force mtg                       Task Force mtg
Oct 28                            Feb 19
Task Force mtg                       Task Force mtg
Nov 25                            Mar 19
Task Force mtg    CDEG                       FH        Phase 2 Recommendations     Phase 3 Recommendations
Sep 30       Nov 27, 2020                    Feb 25       Mar 19                 Jun 1
CDEG     CDEG          AB                  AB                Task Force mtg          Task Force mtg
Sep 30, 2020  Oct 30, 2020      Dec 15, 2020               Feb 25               Apr 19               Jun 23
CDEG     CDEG     CDEG       CDEG    AB     AB  AB      FH      FH      FH      Task Force mtg       Task Force mtg
Sep 15, 2020 Oct 13, 2020 Nov 10, 2020   Dec 15, 2020 Jan 5    Jan 28 Feb 9     Mar 9     Apr 6     May 4     May 21            Jul 16
Task Force mtg
Aug 20
Sep      Oct      Nov     Dec      2021     Feb     Mar      Apr      May      Jun      Jul       Aug
SubCom C - Use -of-Force                             Sep 8 - Jan 11
SubCom D - Ov ersight, Accountability & Civil Rights             Sep 8 - Jan 11
SubCom F - Mu tual Aid                              Sep 8 - Jan 11
SubCom A - Div & Hiring                                           Dec 7 - Mar 1
SubCom B - Training & Dev                                          Dec 7 - Mar 1
SubCom E - Budget, Roles & Equip                                                        Feb 15 - May 10
SubCom G - Advocacy                                                                Feb 15 - May 10
Note: Due to anticipated variances in the complexity of certain issues, subcommittees have varying numbers of meetings. All timelines/dates are tentative. Subcommittees are
activated at their allotted start time, but may be disbanded before or after the estimated dates depending on necessity.


2 As the Use of Force Subcommittee meets every other Thursday, regular meetings fall on Thanksgiving, November
26th, and Christmas Eve, December 24th, and will be rescheduled. 
21CP Solutions  Status Update                                                     5

2.  Port of Seattle Police Department Engagement 
On September 9, 2020, 21CP had initial discussions with Acting Deputy Chief Sean Gillebo
about the role of 21CP, POSPD operations and systems, current POSPD Commission on
Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies ("CALEA") certification, and next steps forward.
Importantly, the POSPD is engaged in recertifying with CALEA, with key dates for that process
falling within the timelines of the Task Force work (December 2020, June 2021, and July 2021).
Commander Gillebo immediately provided organizational structure documents and arranged for a
POSPD tour and in-person discussion about POSPD functions. 
On September 24, 2020, 21CP met with Acting Deputy Chief Sean Gillebo, toured Port
facilities at the airport and surrounding properties, toured the northern properties, and discussed
patrol work by the POSPD. 21CP was provided with maps of all Port properties as well. 
The POSPD policy manual is available on-line here, and Use of Force Reviews from 2017-
2019, CALEA certification documents, Civil Service Rules and the POSPD organizational chart are
available here. 21CP was also provided with an Excel spreadsheet of UOF incidents, including date,
time, call type, suspect race, age, gender, injury of officer or suspect, type of force used, whether
arrested, location, and if involved official business. We also were provided annual Bias Policing
Reports for 2017-2019 and a three-year executive summary on use of force. 
On September 25, 2020, 21CP requested additional information from POSPD including
handbook of procedures not included in the policy manual, schedule of past UOF Boards, Officerinvolved-shootings
or Officer-involved fatalities, mutual aid agreements, after action reports on
missions/demonstrations (to include the 2017 ICE demonstration), training curricula (especially on
force and de-escalation), and access to all UOF reports 2018-2020. Some of these requests are
pending, but the POSPD has been very responsive. Even on the date of an earlier draft of this
report was due to the Task Force, we were provided updated draft policies on Use of Force,
Unusual Occurrences (which would include demonstrations), several emergency planning
documents, the Valley CDU Policy Manual and Tactical SOP, the Valley Independent Investigative
Team Organizational and Operational Guidelines (for OIS review), the Valley SWAT Interlocal
Agreement as well as Seattle PD's Basic Mountain Bike Course (which guides POSPD). In sum,
there is a lot of information coming in that 21CP will work on digesting for the Task Force and
subcommittees. 
On October 14, 2020, 21CP met with Acting Chief Villa, Deputy Chief Thomas, and Acting
Deputy Chief Gillebo to discuss the engagement to date and hear their feedback on an earlier draft
of this report. All were engaged in the discussion, provided valuable insights, and were supportive of
the overall work of the Task Force. Additionally, on October 20, 2020, 21CP attended a POSPD 
Use of Force training, including de-escalation. 

21CP Solutions  Status Update                                                     6

3.  Information Review and Initial Impressions 
21CP has been working to understand POSPD operations, policies, organizational
documents, as well as the many on-the ground processes that may not be captured in policy.
Because we are very early in this process, few of our early impressions have been discussed with the
Task Force, any subcommittee, or the POSPD. As such, most of the below impressions are offered
as a road-map for further exploration, rather than formal recommendations. At the same time, it is
likely that some will become recommendations in the future as the issues are fleshed out.
Additionally, as this project is developing rapidly, additional impressions will be shared in real-time
with the Task Force and sub-committees even as this status update is under review. 
We begin by addressing a critical question posed by the Task Force: are there any
immediate policy changes that need to be implemented to avoid unnecessary uses of force,
especially lethal force? Even as this Task Force was being designed, the Port Commission: 
1.   banned the use of vascular and airway neck restraints (chokeholds); 
2.   required diversity in hiring evaluation panels; 
3.   required disqualification for all applicants based on a sustained finding of excessive force; 
4.   ensured that training include de-escalation, intervention, and anti-bias training; 
5.   included a review of qualified immunity on the Port's legislative agenda; 
6.   continued the moratorium on facial recognition; 
7.   required that POSPD policies be public-facing; and, 
8.   ensured that names are clearly identifiable on any uniform worn on duty. 
Again, we are very early in this process, and there is much to learn and discuss. However,
21CP initially identified a few areas in policies regarding use of force, accountability, and mutual aid 
that POSPD should address urgently. As those recommendations were drafted, we learned that
POSPD, to its credit, was in the process of revising its Use of Force Policy. Those changes appeared
to address many of 21CP's concerns regarding use of force, though the revisions have not been
included in the Policy Manual as of yet, and we are gathering information on related training and will
consider how the policies are put into practice. While none of the identified issues below, including
those regarding accountability and mutual aid, are "quick fixes," like banning chokeholds, those
identified are necessary components of sound policy and should be placed on the roadmap for 
change consideration. 
a.  Use of Force at POSPD 
The context of POSPD use of force informs the policy analysis. Although 21CP has not yet
reviewed force cases, we were able to pull some context from the department's annual reports. The
department consistently has approximately 30 uses of force annually, the vast majority of which
occur in the airport jurisdiction. Most involved weaponless force techniques, such as physical take

21CP Solutions  Status Update                                                     7

downs, punches and knee strikes. Between 2017-2019, there were seven Taser deployments, no
40mm less lethal launcher deployments, one use of a baton, and one use of OC spray3 during the
January 2017 protest against President Trump's "Muslim Ban" policy, which was carried out by U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP).4 Additionally, there was one officer-involved shooting while
the officer was assigned to Valley SWAT for an Auburn, WA call-out. Media reports suggest the
shooting was non-fatal.5 By far, pointing of a firearm and application of leg restraints were the most
frequent force events, accounting for between 6 to 11 of the approximately 30 annual use of force
events. 
The Vascular Neck restraint was introduced to the department in 2018, and two applications
occurred in 2018 and seven applications in 2019. During these applications four subjects lost
consciousness. This technique is now prohibited. 
The reported race of suspects shifted significantly during the period 2017 through 2019.
Although percentages are not particularly useful because of the relatively limited number of uses of
force, they are useful for comparison across years. 
Suspect Race     2017              2018              2019 
White            51%              52%              60% 
Black             44%              42%              30% 
Other            5%               6%               10% 
As with all analyses of disparate impacts, the proper denominator to use to determine
whether a disparity exists can be elusive. The POSPD reports grapple with this issue by noting that
the 2010 census indicates that the population of King County is 7% Black, but also repeatedly notes 
a 2012 study that described SeaTac as, "Among the county's most diverse cities, with 61% personsof-color
and 31% foreign-born." The study is not identified. It is clear that much work will need to
be done to parse through data, with both quantitative and qualitative reviews to accurately measure
what drives these numbers. 
Finally, the 2019 Use of Force report identifies a trend of increasing officer injury rates
during use of force events from 10% in 2017, to 24% in 2018, and to 50% in 2019. A 50% officer
injury rate is concerning, even when only one injury over the three years resulted in an officer
assigned to light duty, there were no officer hospitalizations, and the rest were "minor abrasions,

3 Oleoresin capsicum, or pepper spray. 
4 The 2017 UOF Report indicates a single OC event, however the after-action report for the January 2017 protest
indicates there were five uses of OC. This apparent discrepancy is resolved in the after-action report, which indicates
that the use of OC was as follows: "one by a sergeant for the Port of Seattle PD, one by a sergeant with the Renton PD,
one by an officer with the Renton PD, and two by an officer with Kent PD." Therefore, while the reporting is
consistent, this incident may require consideration by all three active subcommittees. 
5 https://komonews.com/news/local/major-police-operation-shuts-down-roads-in-auburn 

21CP Solutions  Status Update                                                     8

cuts, scratches, or soreness." The reviewing Sergeant did not uncover any specific reasons for this
increase, but hypothesized that sergeants are doing a better job documenting minor injuries. 
However, the report did not discuss the corresponding increase in suspect injuries, from
13% (2017) to 18% (2018) to 23% (2019). This too could be explained by the better documentation
theory, but an increasing number of injuries to both suspects and officers during use of force events 
over time warrants closer examination. 21CP will keep the issue of officer and subject injuries in
mind during the review of the individual use of force cases and see if any patterns emerge. 
b.  Use of Force Policy 
Technically, "Use of Force Policy" is a misnomer. However, it is a useful term to refer
generally to the comprehensive approach of providing guidance on using, reporting, investigating,
and analyzing uses of force in a department. Therefore, the term "Use of Force Policy" refers to the
amalgam of policies that provide guidance about the use of force, including (but perhaps not limited
to): 
POSPD 300  Use of Force 
POSPD 302  Use of Force Review Boards 
POSPD 306  Handcuffing and Restraints 
POSPD 308 - Control Devices and Techniques 
POSPD 309  TASER Device Guidelines 
POSPD 310  Officer-Involved Shootings and Deaths 
POSPD 312  Firearms 
POSPD 313  Edged Weapons 
POSPD 314  Vehicle pursuits 
POSPD 318 - Canines 
POSPD 431  Patrol Rifles 
The Use of Force Policy is a set of boilerplate policies from Lexipol,6 a private company that
seeks to help to reduce liability for police departments, modified by the POSPD to better address its
operations.7 The policy does address many key areas that 21CP looks for in a use of force policy
such as the duty to intervene, limitations on shooting from or at moving vehicles, and situating the
appropriateness of force in objective reasonableness. However, even with an initial review, there are
several areas immediately identified that should be improved. 

6 Lexipol, the Privatization of Police Policymaking, Eagly, Ingrid, Schwartz, Joanna C., Texas Law Review Volume 96, Issue 5. 
7 As a general note, 21CP finds Lexipol designed policies to be overly complex and technical, hard to comprehend,
disjointed, and poor at providing clear guidance to officers. While a comprehensive review of the whole policy manual is
far beyond the scope of this project, at the outset we are compelled to note this comprehensive issue. 
21CP Solutions  Status Update                                                     9

On October 1, 2020, 21CP received draft policies from POSPD that were apparently under
legal review. We were informed that these policies are now "live" and they were trained in the
October 20, 2020, Use of Force Training, but they do not yet appear on the website. These revised
policies purport to address many of the policy deficiencies initially identified, including the lack of a
de-escalation policy, the lack of a mandate to issue a warning, when feasible, before using lethal
force, and the lack of an affirmative mandate to provide medical treatment and/or summon medical
aid. Except as set forth below, we have not had time to fully analyze these policies thoroughly
against best practices, but are encouraged that the department was already thinking about these
necessary changes. 
Issue 1:       Lack of a de-escalation policy. 
The Use of Force policy lists factors to consider in determining the reasonableness of force,
including critical issues such as subject's mental state or capacity, officer/subject factors (age, size,
relative strength, skill level etc.), and "availability of other options and their possible effectiveness."8 
However, there is no de-escalation policy or specific requirement to de-escalate in the overall policy.
The only reference to "de-escalation" in the policy is in connection with the deployment of a kinetic
energy projectile "in an attempt to de-escalate a potentially deadly situation."9 Using a lower level of
force when appropriate is consistent with de-escalation concepts, but this does not capture the full
scope of the tactics, skills, and strategies that are part and parcel of de-escalation. Separately, there is
a requirement that there be training in "De-escalation Techniques/Verbal Communication Skills."10 
The POSPD apparently trains on de-escalation. In initial conversations with POSPD,
personnel asserted that "de-escalation is part of everything we do." However, without a clear policy
that mandates that de-escalation  the use of time, distance, shielding, resources, and
communication  be utilized whenever safe and feasible, there is no mechanism to hold officers
accountable who do not de-escalate when they should, or whose actions might affirmatively escalate
a situation. 
While we have not had a chance to fully review the new draft Lexipol policy, the totality of
the guidance on de-escalation in that policy reads: 
When circumstances reasonably permit, officers should use non-violent strategies
and techniques to decrease the intensity of a situation, improve decision-making,
improve communication, reduce the need for force, and increase voluntary
compliance (e.g., summoning additional resources, formulating a plan, attempting
verbal persuasion). 

8 POSPD 300.3.2. 
9 POSPD 308.8. 
10 POSPD 386.4. 

21CP Solutions  Status Update                                                    10

At the very least, we would expect the policy to be more mandatory than "when
circumstances reasonably permit," to include mandatory language of "shall" or "will" rather than
"should," and to provide more specific guidance about what techniques are expected and available.
Additionally, "when circumstances reasonably permit" seems too vague and non-committal; officers
should de-escalate when safe and feasible. But again, it is good to see that the department was
already in the process of addressing this critical issue. 
Issue 2:        The policy should more clearly indicate the Department's commitment to
valuing and upholding the sanctity of human life, and the connection of those
values with its Use of Force policy. 
Current POSPD policy indicates that "[t]he department recognizes and respects the value of
all human life and dignity without prejudice to anyone. Vesting officers with the authority to use
reasonable force and to protect the public welfare requires monitoring, evaluation and a careful
balancing of all interests."11 This is a clear statement of values. The POSPD policy further states that
the "ultimate objective of every law enforcement encounter is to avoid or minimize, nothing in this
policy requires an officer to retreat or be exposed to possible physical injury before applying
reasonable force."12 This is likely an appropriate statement, although we would suggest that any
"possible physical injury" is insufficiently precise.
Best practices could connect the two concepts: 
Police Officers have the responsibility to use force, when necessary, to protect life
and safety, to effect an arrest and/or keep the peace. It is the policy of the Port of
Seattle Police Department to value and preserve human life when using lawful
authority to use force. Therefore, officers of the Port of Seattle Police Department
shall use only the amount of necessary and proportional force that the objectively
reasonable officer would use in light of the circumstances to effectively bring an
incident or person under control, while protecting the lives of the member or others.
Members are advised that this Department places restrictions on officer use of force
that go beyond the restrictions set forth under the Constitution or state law.13 
Issue 3.        The Use of Force Policy should expressly require Reasonable, Necessary, and
Proportional Force. 
POSPD 300.3 states that "Officers shall use only that amount of force that reasonably
appears necessary given the facts and circumstances perceived by the officer at the time of the event

11 POSPD 300.2. 
12 POSPD 300.3. 
13 Derived from a combination of the New Orleans and Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Use of Force
policies. 
21CP Solutions  Status Update                                                    11

to accomplish a legitimate law enforcement purpose." The policy does not appear to define
necessary, though RCW 9A.16.010 provides the following definition: "'Necessary' means that no
reasonably effective alternative to the use of force appeared to exist and that the amount of force
used was reasonable to effect the lawful purpose intended." As the language in RCW 9A.16.010
already incorporates the "no reasonably effective alternative to the use of force language," it appears
that "reasonably necessary" is likely redundant. 
Many departments' force policies specifically require that the nature or severity of the force 
that an officer uses be proportional to, or consistent with, the nature of the threat posed by the
subject. As such, the best force policies expressly require that all force must be reasonable,
necessary, and proportional. The Task Force should consider whether that is the direction the
POSPD should go. 
Issue 4:        The Use of Force Policy should require officers to provide a warning, when
safe and feasible, before using lethal force. 
The Use of Force policy requires, consistent with legal standards, that officers issue a verbal
warning, when feasible, before using deadly force to stop a fleeing suspect "when the officer has
probable cause to believe that the person has committed, or intends to commit, a felony involving
the infliction or threatened infliction of serious bodily injury or death, and the officer reasonably
believes that there is an imminent risk of serious bodily injury or death to any other person if the
subject is not immediately apprehended."14 This standard is consistent with the law. However, 21CP
recommends that POSPD simply require that officers issue a verbal warning before using deadly
force in any context so long as a reasonable officer, under the circumstances, would determine that
issuing a warning would be safe and feasible. 
Issue 5:        The Use of Force Policy should require officers to provide medical care within
the scope of their training and immediately summon medical aid to the scene. 
POSPD 300.6 requires: "Prior to booking or release, medical assistance shall be obtained for
any person who exhibits signs of physical distress, who has sustained visible injury, expresses a
complaint of injury or continuing pain, or who was rendered unconscious." Similarly, the updated
draft Lexipol policy states "Once it is reasonably safe to do so, medical assistance shall be obtained
for any person who exhibits signs of physical distress, has sustained visible injury, expresses a
complaint of injury or continuing pain, or was rendered unconscious." Other policies, such as
POSPD 309.7 (Taser) and 308.6.2. (OC Spray), provide additional guidance for medical treatment
following deployment of these tools. The Task Force should consider whether to mandate that
officers provide medical care within the scope of their training and be required to summon medical
aid to the scene for any person who requests it or is apparently in need of such aid after a use of
force. 
14 POSPD 300.4. 

21CP Solutions  Status Update                                                    12

However, POSPD 466, which is not in the Use of Force policies, provides that "[w]henever
practicable, members should take appropriate steps to provide initial medical aid (e.g., first aid, CPR,
and use of an automated external defibrillator (AED) in accordance with their training and current
certification levels. As such, officers already have a general duty to provide medical treatment, but
that duty is confused by conflicting guidance in the Use of Force policy. The language in POSPD
466 is exactly the language that should be considered for incorporation into the use of force policy
(or cross-referenced). Again, this may be another example where the department policy is correct,
but overly complex and scattered so that clarity is lost. 
c.  Oversight, Accountability, and Transparency 
21CP is tasked with assessing POSPD's oversight, accountability, and transparency
measures. 21CP is looking for POSPD polices and protocols that clearly convey the mission and
values of the Department so that officers and other employees have a clear understanding of
expectations pertaining to conduct.15 21CP also is assessing POSPD's complaint and discipline
system to ensure that it processes complaints thoroughly, fairly, and in a timely manner and that the
approach to discipline encourages changes to conduct when required and is appropriate to the
circumstances involved. These types of benchmarks help ensure accountability, while others foster
transparency and oversight. 21CP is only in the beginning stage of understanding the many
individual policies involved and the relationships among different policies and other governing
provisions in setting conduct expectations for POSPD officers and addressing allegations of
misconduct, but can offer some early observations and share next steps that will be taken regarding
the assessment of oversight, accountability, and transparency issues. 
21CP's assessment in this area, which will continually be informed by the work of the
Oversight Subcommittee, has started with a review of misconduct complaint processing, discipline
alternatives when a complaint is sustained, and protocols to address retaliation concerns.16 The
assessment related to these topics alone requires reference to applicable sections of the POSPD
Policy Manual, up to seven (7) collective bargaining agreements,17 the Police Officers' Bill of Rights
and Code of Conduct/Workplace Responsibility Handbook appendices attached to some of the
agreements, Port of Seattle Police Civil Service Rules, and the Port of Seattle Code of Ethics &
Workplace Conduct.18 
Relevant sections of the Policy Manual identified at this early stage of the assessment include
Standards of Conduct (Policy 340), Personnel Complaints (Policy 1020), and the Disciplinary System
15 See, e.g., IACP Model Policy -Standards of Conduct and related Concepts & Issues Paper (updated July 2019). 
16 21CP is considering impacts on racial equity and civil rights throughout its assessment, though the Oversight
Subcommittee has specific responsibility for input on these issues, along with considering oversight and accountability at
the POSPD. 
17 21CP has identified seven collective bargaining contracts for various groups of POSPD employees including Police
and Fire Communications (Dispatch), Police Department Non-Sworn Supervisors, Police Department Traffic Support
Specialists, Police Specialists, Police Officers, Police Sergeants, and Police Commanders. 
18 Other governing documents may yet be identified. 

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(Policy 341). There are specific policies in each section that 21CP would generally expect to find,
including: a statement that the conduct standards listed are not intended to be exhaustive; both onand
off-duty conduct is subject to discipline; all complaints, regardless of the method conveyed, will
be reviewed and investigated, including anonymous complaints; complaints are classified for
handling and systematically tracked; complaint investigation protocols, disposition alternatives, and
appeal rights are identified; unique complaint issues such as those involving criminal allegations are
flagged; retaliation for filing a complaint is prohibited; and, discipline outcomes for sustained
complaints are detailed.
However, similar to the observation regarding Use of Force, the POSPD's reliance on
Lexipol boilerplate policy to define conduct expectations and processes for the complaint and
discipline system results in specific polices that can be repetitive, overlapping, contradictory, or
otherwise confusing. In addition, whether explicitly stated or not, some polices also require
reference to other resources, such as the applicable collective bargaining agreement, which make the
policies less useful guides to performance expectations for POSPD personnel. 
21CP met with the Sergeant currently overseeing the Office of Professional Accountability
(OPA). He assumed the assignment in May 2020, following an application and scenario based
interview process. He received on-the-job training from his predecessor and sits on the Command
Staff, which appears to facilitate information sharing and coordination concerning complaint
processing. In addition to his OPA duties, the Sergeant also serves as the POSPD Public
Information Officer (PIO) liaison to the Port's media office and is the Defensive Tactics Training
Coordinator. The OPA Sergeant also serves on the Task Force Oversight Subcommittee. 
21CP consultants are in the process of obtaining a Criminal Justice Information Services
(CJIS) security clearance required prior to reviewing detailed use of force and complaint
information. Meanwhile, based on 2015  2019 intake data provided by the OPA Sergeant, the
POSPD receives an average of 31 inquires and complaints each year, with an average of 23 per year
(about 75%) of the contacts involving inquiries (a classification category used when the alleged facts,
even if true, do not involve a policy violation). 21CP will provide more detailed information
concerning complaint intake, investigations, and outcomes as the assessment moves forward. 
Issue 1:        The complaint classification scheme is unnecessarily technical, terms used
are not consistently well defined, and the assignment system does not serve quality control 
goals. 
POSPD classifies complaints alleging policy violations as either a Minor, Moderate, or Major
Complaint (along with the inquiry classification, used when the complaint, even if true, does not
involve a policy violation).19 This scheme appears unnecessarily technical, given the relatively few
complaints handled by the POSPD. 21CP will explore other costs and benefits to using Lexipol
19 POSPD 1020.3. 

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policies as the assessment continues, but for now, for illustration, note the circular nature of the
definition used for "Minor Complaints": 
Complaints involving allegations against department members when the actions or
behavior of the employee constitutes violations of department policy that are minor 
in nature. Discipline resulting from a sustained finding involving minor complaints
will generally not result in any property loss...(i.e. suspension, demotion, termination,
etc.). Minor complaint allegations may include...[complaints about courtesy, minor
service issues, minor traffic violations], and complaints of actions committed by a
department member deemed to be minor policy violations." 
Defining a "minor complaint" as one that involves a minor policy violation does not provide
helpful guidance to POSPD officers, supervisors, and other staff, or for other Port employees and
public stakeholders, and thus does not serve the goal of transparency and undercuts accountability. 
POSPD provides that complaints are, at least initially, processed differently depending on
whether they are in writing or oral.20 Written inquiries and complaints are first forwarded to the
administrative specialist of the Chief of Police, who confirms receipt with the complainant and then
refers the matter to OPA for classification and assignment. In-person or telephoned complaints are
forwarded to an on-duty supervisor for intake, and then the supervisor determines how to classify
the complaint. It appears that the on-duty supervisor either handles or refers to the first-line
supervisor any investigation of complaints deemed to be minor. If a moderate or major complaint is
involved, they are to be referred to "the affected commander" for review, who then forwards it to
OPA for assignment. 
While an approach that sets up different processes based on whether a complaint is made in
writing, in-person, or over the telephone presumably encourages thorough information gathering
while a complainant is more immediately available and provides for up-front feedback to a
complainant submitting a written complaint, the system appears unnecessarily complicated and
confusing, given the relatively few complaints involved. While inquiries and complaints are entered
and tracked through IAPro/BlueTeam, at this early stage of the assessment, it also is not clear that
anyone involved is responsible for coordinating the overall complaint classification system. The lack
of clear quality control for this one aspect of complaint processing calls into question whether
internal accountability/oversight goals can be met by POSPD. Further assessment is needed before
drawing final conclusions. 


20 POSPD 1020.4. 

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Issue 2:        Timelines should be set for individual steps throughout the investigation
process. 
POSPD policy states that administrative investigations should not extend over ninety- (90)
calendar days, which can be extended if needed, with notice to the subject employee.21 Department
policy does not appear to set other timelines for completing the various steps involved with 
complaint intake, investigation, and disposition, contrary to what 21CP would expect to find. The
team was referred to the POSPD Police Officers' collective bargaining agreement for deadlines 
related to complaint processing. Though the 21CP team has by no means assimilated the entire
collective bargaining agreement, the only complaint related timeline evident was a requirement in
Appendix B, Police Officer Bill of Rights, that an employee be notified within five (5) days if they
are subject to an investigation by the Internal Investigations Section (presumably OPA). Other
governing documents may reference specific timeline requirements such as seen regarding appeals
and hearings under the Police Civil Service Rules. 21CP will continue to explore all relevant policies
and procedures to determine if there is a system to ensure timely complaint processing. 
Issue 3:        The Standards of Conduct incorporated into POSPD policy are disorganized
and confusing, and are not placed into context with the Port's Code of
Conduct. 
Administrative misconduct complaints are tied to a police department's policies and
procedures that set out conduct expectations, both generally and specifically. POSPD Policy 340/
Standards of Conduct refers to CALEA 26.1.1, and it is not clear to 21CP, at this early stage,
whether the policy relies primarily on CALEA model policies or also includes standards proposed by
Lexipol or other references. 
Although issues related to standards of conduct will continue to be explored as the
assessment moves forward, 21CP offers some initial observations. First, as with some other policies
discussed, Policy 340/Standards of Conduct is confusing to read, internally disorganized, and does
not consistently serve the goal of articulating conduct standards in a way that promotes clear
understanding by employees. In contrast, the Port of Seattle Code of Conduct is plainly written and
well organized, clearly stating the Port's values that employees: 
Conduct business with the highest of standards; 
Honor their commitments to one another, the community, and the Port's customers; 
Recognize that employees are capable, high performing people who appreciate the privilege
of public service; and, 
Encourage employees to embrace the richness of a diverse workplace and support employee
development. 
21 POSPD 1020.6.4. 

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These values are then individually delineated without unnecessary repetition and with clear
guidance on where to direct questions concerning the conduct standards and the complaint
investigation process when the conduct code is allegedly breached. 
Second, while the Port's Code of Conduct offers easily understood guidance for employee
conduct expectations, it is still necessary that the POSPD have a set of standards complimenting the
Port's, but one that incorporates the unique values and ethics associated with police services. Finally,
POSPD policy should clearly articulate how its Standards of Conduct relate to the Port's Code of
Conduct, along with any collective bargaining agreement's attached MOU regarding the Code of
Conduct/Workplace Responsibility Handbook, and any other governing documents. 21CP, with
input from the Oversight Subcommittee, will continue to assess these issues. 
Issue 4.        There is no clear protocol for handling conflict of interest issues that can
occur with misconduct complaint processing. 
The POSPD policy that sets out guidelines for reporting and investigating misconduct
complaints does not include a provision addressing potential conflicts of interest. POSPD does have
a policy on Nepotism and Conflicting Relationships, with the purpose defined as, "to ensure equal
opportunity and effective employment practices by avoiding actual or perceived favoritism,
discrimination, or actual or perceived conflicts of interest by or between members of this
department."22 The policy includes "discipline" among the list of employment practices that are
covered. However, there is no explanation in this policy or elsewhere concerning the identification
of and protocols to address specific conflict of interest concerns in the complaint handling or
discipline processes. 
In all departments where sworn members are tasked with investigating complaints against
other members in the same organization, unique issues of perceived or actual conflict of interest can
crop up. Furthermore, since even those who have engaged in criminal activity should have an
avenue to complain about officer misconduct, those engaged in investigating complaints cannot be
swayed by any underlying alleged criminal behavior by the complainant. The goal is to ensure that
everyone involved in the investigation and review process is capable of being objective, fair, and
unbiased with regards to the subject officer, complainant, witnesses, and issues raised. Where there
are questions of perceived or actual conflict of interest, the policy should explicitly state the steps to
be taken to resolve any concerns. 
21CP looks forward to working with the POSPD to further explore the issue of conflict of
interest and other matters discussed throughout this report, along with discussions with the
subcommittees and Task Force as it continues with the assessment and develops recommendations
to enhance POSPD's service to the Port of Seattle community. 

22 POSPD 1050.1. 

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d.  Mutual Aid 
Mutual Aid is a term that warrants definition. As discussed at the first subcommittee
meeting, the term generally refers to assistance under RCW 10.93, the Washington Mutual Aid Peace
Officers Powers Act and agreements defined by RCW 39.34, the Interlocal Cooperation Act. 21CP
has reviewed POSPD polices and provided agreements governing cooperation with other law
enforcement agencies. As with Use of Force and Oversight, the below considerations are early in
this process and are offered as areas to explore, rather than formal recommendations. Additionally,
these have been generated by initial review, so it is plausible that these issues are addressed in other
policies or procedures and we look forward to discussing these further with the Task Force, the subcommittee
, and the POSPD. 
Issue 1.        It is not clear how broadly the term "mutual aid" is used by POSPD in 
its policies and enforcement practices. 
Identified POSPD agreements under the statutes noted above include: 
1.   The Interlocal Cooperative Agreement Valley Special Response Team (with the Cities of
Auburn, Kent, Renton, and Tukwila, which provides "enhanced use of personnel,
equipment, budgeted funds, and training" to respond to high-risk incidents such as "civil
disobedience, barricaded subjects, hostage situations, gang member arrests, high risk
felony arrests, and narcotic/high risk search warrants;"23 
2.   The Valley Independent Investigative Team (with the Cities of Auburn, Des Moines,
Federal Way, Kent, Renton, and Tukwila), to "independently, thoroughly and objectively
investigate the most serious Incidents involving police officers, including but not limited
to: 
Officer involved uses of deadly force that result in death, substantial bodily
harm, or great bodily harm; 
In-custody deaths or life-threatening injuries; 
Death or life-threatening injuries of a police employee; 
Other matters as directed by the Executive Board"24; and 
3.   The Valley Civil Disturbance Unit (with the Cities of Auburn, Federal Way, Kent,
Renton, and Tukwila) to provide "South King County Cities with well-trained and
equipped police response for effective crowd control and quelling civil disturbances."25 

23 Interlocal Cooperative Agreement Valley Special Response Team. 
24 Valley Special Response Team Operational Agreement. 
25 The Valley Civil Disturbance Unit (VCDU) Tactical Standard Operating Procedures. 

21CP Solutions  Status Update                                                    18

However, the POSPD has a unique jurisdiction that is a patchwork across many other
jurisdictions, and POSPD has many ad hoc relationships with neighboring jurisdictions. As such, the
sub-committee is considering the scope of what "mutual aid" will mean for the work of the Task
Force. 
The review of mutual aid policies has just begun, as the documents were just received from
POSPD (not implying any delay on the Department's part  again, the POSPD has been very
helpful). The agreement authorizing all Washington State Law Enforcement Agencies to operate in
Port jurisdictions can be found here. This is a common, boilerplate agreement without restrictions  
the vast majority of WA agencies, if not all, have similar agreements. 
Issue 2.       When the POSPD engages in mutual aid involving noticed events, at 
the Port or in other jurisdictions, incident planning documents and 
after-action reports should provide perspective in assessing these 
events. 
We are in the process of reviewing after-action reports, agreements around Valley CDU and
Valley SWAT, and are interested in exploring instances of mutual training. For example, we were
provided the Seattle Police Bicycle Training  we are interested in following up to see if physical,
joint training occurred with Seattle. 
Of particular interest to the sub-committee are the events and lessons learned from the
January 28-29, 2017 demonstrations after "the President of the United States signed an Executive
Order on Immigration, impacting travel from seven Muslim-majority countries"26 Based on the
magnitude of the protests and the call from protesters to "shut down the airport," mutual aid was
requested from agencies throughout King County. Many responded, with 116 officers responding
as follows: 
Valley Civil Disturbance Unit (VCDU) consisting of officers from Tukwila PD, 
Renton PD, Federal Way PD, Kent PD, and Auburn PD (35) 
Valley SWAT Unit consisting of officers from the same departments (23) 
King County Sheriff's Office and King County Metro (12) 
Bellevue Police Department (6) 
Normandy Park Police Department (3) 
Washington State Patrol (12) 
Seattle Police Department (25)27 

26 Executive Order Protest After Action Report at 3. 
27 Id. 

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"By the end of the night, police had made a total of 34 arrests, one for assaulting an officer
and 33 for Disorderly Conduct and Failure to Disperse" and there were "five instances where 
pepper spray was used on protesters: one by a sergeant for the Port of Seattle PD, one by a 
sergeant with the Renton PD, one by an officer with the Renton PD, and two by an officer with 
Kent PD."28 The POSPD issued a 50 page after-action report, which is consistent with best practices
for analyzing any major event and cultivating lessons-learned. In the after-action report, the POSPD
self-identified "what went well," responded to "questions and answers regarding issues and
perceptions relating to the protest" (anticipating questions of public interest and specifically
answering questions from Port leadership), and conducted a use of force review on all of the
identified uses of force, including the five pepper spray deployments. 21CP will continue to examine
this incident and the after-action report with the sub-committee. 
Issue 3.       Mutual Aid Agreements should clearly indicate that POSPD officers are
bound by POSPD Policies. 
POSPD 106.1, Purpose and Scope, states: "The manual is a statement of the current
policies, procedures, rules, and guidelines of this department. All employees are to conform to the
provisions of this manual." POSPD 352.3, Assisting Outside Agencies, states: "When another law
enforcement agency requests assistance from this department, the on-duty shift supervisor may
authorize, if available, an appropriate number of personnel to assist. Members are reminded that their
actions when rendering assistance must conform with applicable laws and be consistent with the policies of this
department." These polices seem to clarify that POSPD officers are bound by POSPD policy even
when assisting other agencies, but the language of "be consistent with the policies" should be
considered for strengthening. 
None of the agreements we reviewed clearly set forth the expectation that even though
officers cooperating with area task forces are led by the primary agency that officers are bound by
the POSPD policy. Even if true under POSPD policy expectations, the agreements themselves
should make that clear to all participating agencies. 
Two sub-issues in this area should also be examined: civil immigration enforcement and pretext
stops. 
Civil immigration enforcement 
In alignment with the Port of Seattle's Welcoming Port Policy Directive (Resolution 3747),
POSPD 427.2, Immigration Violations, states: 
It is the policy of the Port of Seattle Police Department that officers will not initiate
police action based solely on an individual's immigration or alien status, nor shall
28 Id. at 4. 

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they ask for identification or documents to establish the person's immigration or
alien status. Under ordinary circumstances, a general request for adequate
identification as part of a criminal investigation is all that is necessary 
or appropriate. 
Furthermore, it is this organization's intent to foster trust and cooperation with all
people served by the Department. Complainants, witnesses and victims are
encouraged to communicate with police officers without fear of inquiry regarding
their immigration or alien status. Being an undocumented person in this country,
barring any criminal activity, is a federal civil violation not enforced by officers of the
Department. 
While the POSPD policy is clear on expectations, consideration should be given to include express
limitations on officers participating in enforcement activities with other agencies, prohibiting them
from engaging in civil immigration enforcement while engaged with the other agency. This is likely
covered under the mandate to follow all POSPD policies and other limitations set forth in RCW
10.93.160, Immigration and citizenship statusLaw enforcement agency restrictions, however
including a limitation on civil immigration enforcement in all Mutual Aid agreements clearly puts
partner agencies on notice and makes a clear public statement. 
Pre-text stops 
Pre-text stops (initiating law enforcement activity for an observed minor violation with the
intent of exploring different potential criminal activity) are permitted under the United States
Constitution, but not permitted under Article I, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution. As such,
federal law enforcement officers are permitted to use pre-text stops, but not Washington peace
officers. There is some ambiguity about whether Washington officers assigned to federal task forces
may use pre-text stops when supporting federal investigations. Consideration should be given to
expressly forbid pre-text law enforcement activities by POSPD officers. 
Issue 4.        Mutual Aid agreements and requests should address limitations on less-lethal
tools or other use of force tactics other jurisdictions can employ when
working with the Port in response to a Port request for aid. 
RCW 10.93.050 (part of the Washington Mutual Aid Peace Officers Powers Act), specifically
provides supervisory authority to the primary commissioning agency. As such, an agency requesting
Mutual Aid can condition that aid on requirements about what tools, tactics, and use of force may
be applied during that aid. Consideration should be given to tailoring the POSPD Mutual Aid
agreements to specify what rules of engagement POSPD will permit when receiving assistance and
when providing aid to other agencies. 

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e.  Conclusion 
In sum, 21CP is very encouraged by the early engagement with the Task Force and the
POSPD, although it has been something of a whirlwind. We look forward to moving forward with
the subcommittees, beginning community engagement, and continuing to work collaboratively with
the POSPD. 
Clearly, and as repeatedly stated, this is a preliminary status update and much of the
information gathered to date may prove to be incorrect upon further exploration, but 21CP intends
to keep exploring issues and presenting them to the Task Force and subcommittees for further
discussion. 














21CP Solutions  Status Update                                                    22